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Private communication detection (PCD) enables an ordinary network user to discover 
communication patterns (e.g., call time, length, frequency, and initiator) between two 
or more private parties. Analysis of communication patterns between private parties 
has historically been a powerful tool used by intelligence, military, law-enforcement 
and business organizations because it can reveal the strength of tie between these 
parties. Ordinary users are assumed to have neither eavesdropping capabilities (e.g., 
the network may employ strong anonymity measures) nor the legal authority (e.g. no 
ability to issue a warrant to network providers) to collect private-communication 
records. We show that PCD is possible by ordinary users merely by sending packets 
 
 
to various network end-nodes and analyzing the responses. Three approaches for PCD 
are proposed based on a new type of side channels caused by resource contention, and 
defenses are proposed. The Resource-Saturation PCD exploits the resource contention 
(e.g., a fixed-size buffer) by sending carefully designed packets and monitoring 
different responses. Its effectiveness has been demonstrated on three commercial 
closed-source VoIP phones. The Stochastic PCD shows that timing side channels in 
the form of probing responses, which are caused by distinct resource-contention 
responses when different applications run in end nodes, enable effective PCD despite 
network and proxy-generated noise (e.g., jitter, delays). It was applied to WiFi and 
Instant Messaging for resource contention in the radio channel and the keyboard, 
respectively. Similar analysis enables practical Sybil node detection. Finally, the 
Service-Priority PCD utilizes the fact that 3G/2G mobile communication systems 
give higher priority to voice service than data service. This allows detection of the 
busy status of smartphones, and then discovery of their call records by correlating the 
busy status. This approach was successfully applied to iPhone and Android phones in 
AT&T’s network. An additional, unanticipated finding was that an Internet user could 
disable a 2G phone’s voice service by probing it with short enough intervals (e.g., 1 
second). PCD defenses can be traditional side-channel countermeasures or PCD-
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Privacy has different meanings in different contexts. In communications, a system 
may provide anonymity, a quantifiable form of privacy, to its users. Side channels are 
communicational channels that leak information unintentionally. This dissertation 
will investigate the interaction between side channels and communication anonymity. 
1.1. Motivation 
Ordinary phone call records - even in the absence of voice/data content - have proven 
to be exceedingly useful for discovering relationships between private parties. Such 
records are so useful that both law-enforcement and business organizations have even 
broken US law to surreptitiously collect these records [49, 50, 69, 72]. Yet one does 
not actually need to surreptitiously collect 1.9 trillion call records, as the NSA was 
reported to have done between 2001 and 2004 [10, 49], in order to discover the 
communication patterns (e.g., call time, length, frequency, and initiator) that could 
reveal the strength of relationships between private parties [25]. A few thousand 
records, or less, would suffice, as was the cases in the reported illegal collection of 
records in incidents by the FBI, and by HP’s former Chairman of the Board [50, 69]. 
Whether collected legally or not, the capacity of relatively few call records to enable 
detection of private relationships is clearly illustrated by law-enforcement successes 
worldwide; e.g., the discovery of a drug ring in New Zealand, drug smuggling in 
Minnesota prisons, and pornography groups on Moldova [49, 72]. Sometimes, call-




initial phase of surveillance, because the transcription effort of call contents is 
considerable [72]. 
Such success in utilizing communication records inspired us to rethink the privacy 
attacks that are possible in current and future communications networks, which are 
able to apply strong secure and privacy measures. 
1.2. Side Channels and Covert Channels 
Side channels [2, 4, 7, 8, 40, 41, 43, 51] and covert channels [26, 29, 42] are two 
highly-related terms about information leakage in cyber security. The difference is 
illustrated in Figure 1. These channels are not designed for communication, but they 
both may be used to obtain or convey information in violation of a network’s security 
policy. 
 
Figure 1. Covert channel and side channel 
Covert channel: Through a channel not 
designed for communication, an insider 
adversary passes information to an outsider 
adversary in violation of a security 
property 
Side channel: Through a channel not 
designed for communication, an outsider 
adversary obtains the information from the 













Suppose a system contains certain information that is desirable by an outsider 
adversary (or external adversary) and the security policy does not allow such 
information to be obtained by those outside of the system. Roughly speaking, a side 
channel is one that an outsider adversary can use to obtain inside information, using it 
in ways that are not designed for communication. In contrast, a covert channel is one 
that an insider adversary (i.e., Trojan horse) can use to convey the private information 
to another outsider adversary by a method that is not designed for communication. 
The major difference between a side channel and a covert channel lies in that the side 
channel does not have an insider adversary. 
1.2.1. Examples 
We show examples for both channels. Huskamp’s quantum-time channel is a covert 
channel that conveys information from a process (insider adversary) in an operating 
system to another process (outsider adversary) by exploiting the CPU scheduler [29]. 
The security policy prohibits this information flow. The CPU is a shared resource 
which is accessible to both processes. Specifically, a process can assign jobs to the 
CPU (i.e., via write privileges on the shared resource) and check the waiting time of 
itself (i.e., via read privileges to the shared resource). To execute this convert channel, 
a process (insider adversary) that wants to send out information, encodes the 
information to its CPU time use. For example, 0 and 1 are transmitted by using 1 unit 
and 2 units of CPU time, respectively. Another process (outsider adversary) is able to 
decode the information by measuring its waiting time. In this case, CPU scheduling is 




Kocher’s timing attack uses a timing side channel to break public-key cryptography 
systems [40]. Public-key cryptography systems require substantial computation in 
calculating exponents. Kocher found that different keys result in different 
computation times. Therefore, the adversary, who would like to obtain the protected 
key inside a cryptography device, can use the device to perform cryptography 
operations (e.g., encryption) and measure the computation times. The adversary can 
further use the timing information to infer the key stored in the cryptography device.  
In this case, the time used for computation is not designed for communication, but 
can be exploited by an adversary. 
1.2.2. Terminology 
However, the early uses and corresponding definitions of both channels in the context 
of a single machine do not reflect the advances of communication technologies.  
Among many different definitions, Wagner and Murdoch provide a new working 
definition, as described below, for the context of this highly mobilized and wireless 
networked world [52].  
Side channel: A communication channel which violates a security property, but 
where the sender unintentionally leaks information and only the receiver wishes 
the communication to succeed. 
Covert channel: A means of communicating on a computer system, where both 
the sender and receiver collude to leak information, over a channel not intended 





Although the distinction between the side channel and covert channel has been 
identified [52], the criteria for converting between a side channel and a covert channel 
has not been discussed in the extant literature. For simplicity, we still use the insider 
and outsider adversary terms in the rest of this paper. For the side-channel-to-covert-
channel conversion, if an insider adversary is added to a side channel, a covert 
channel is formed if the new insider adversary can decide the information to be 
received by outsider adversary. For the covert-channel-to-side-channel conversion, if 
insider adversary of a covert channel is removed, a side channel is formed if the 
information received by the outsider adversary is of his/her interest.   
We demonstrate this conversion through the example of the quantum-time channel, a 
covert channel. In the quantum-time channel, a process (outsider adversary) can 
monitor its waiting time to infer the program behavior of another program 
(information of interest). This is actually a side channel where an adversary, in the 
form of one process, gets information about another process’ behavior. However, this 
side channel is only meaningful when the adversary regards the program behavior of 
another process as the information of interest. Moreover, in a system with the given 
side channel, the quantum-time channel cannot be established if processes cannot 
affect the CPU scheduler (e.g., round-robin scheduling).  
1.3. Anonymity 
The term privacy has many definitions, such as “the right to be alone” by Judge 
Cooley in 1888, and “the condition of not having undocumented personal knowledge 




dissertation is on communication systems, we focus on the features of anonymity, a 
property or subset of the conception of privacy, instead of the broader definition of 
privacy. This limitation is helpful, since anonymity is quantifiable.  
Informally, anonymity is the ability to conduct communication without being 
identified [52]. Pfitzmann and Hansen gave the following definitions for anonymity 
and related terms [61]. 
Anonymity of a subject means that the subject is not identifiable within a set of 
subjects, the anonymity set.  
Anonymity can be defined with respect to different kinds of entities, including the 
message sender (sender anonymity) and message recipient (recipient anonymity). If 
the sender of a message cannot be identified among a set of possible senders, sender 
anonymity is maintained.  Similarly, we say that recipient anonymity is provided if 
the recipient of a message cannot be identified among a set of possible recipients. 
Also, the concept of anonymity is defined with respect to the messages, based on the 
definition of Unlinkability [61].  
Unlinkability of two or more items of interest (IOIs, e.g., senders, recipients, 
messages) from an attacker’s perspective means that within the system 
(comprising these and possibly other items), the attacker cannot sufficiently 
distinguish whether these IOIs are related or not. 
In communication systems, the relationship anonymity of two messages refers to the 
fact that two messages are unlinkable [61]. In other words, if an adversary eavesdrops 




different places are related (e.g., an encrypted message passes through the two 
places), then there is no relationship anonymity for these messages. In the broader 
sense, if communication records, including telephone call records, are disclosed, the 
corresponding relationship anonymity of caller and callee is infringed upon.  
1.3.1. Anonymity Systems 
Encryption provides data confidentiality such that only the users who have the correct 
key can decrypt the encrypted messages. In communication networks, whether 
encryption can be applied to a whole network packet, including headers and payload, 
depends on the type of the network. In broadcast networks, a whole packet can be 
encrypted because all users will receive this packet and only those who have the 
correct key can decrypt it. This also provides anonymity, since the address headers 
(e.g., a destination address header) are encrypted, meaning that the adversary is 
unable to identify the sender or the recipient from the encrypted packet. However, in 
unicast networks, the destination address header cannot be encrypted; otherwise the 
packet cannot be delivered. An adversary who captures such a packet is able to 
identify the recipient of this packet, and sometimes even the sender, if the sender 
address header is not encrypted. In this case, the recipient anonymity (or the sender 
anonymity when the sender address header is not encrypted) cannot be maintained. 
To address this problem, anonymity systems, which deliver a message through 
multiple links, were introduced. 
In addition to applying encryption on communication links, an anonymity system 




anonymous system uses a trusted third party that relays the messages between the 
message sender and the message recipient [15, 17]. If an adversary can only 
eavesdrop on traffic on one of the two links between the end-node and the relaying 
host, sender anonymity or the recipient anonymity is maintained. However, if the 
single relaying host is compromised, the anonymity provided disappears. Hence, 
other anonymity systems that utilize multiple relaying hosts were introduced [17, 20]. 
These systems use multiple relaying hosts, such that the partial compromise of 
relaying hosts would not necessarily threaten anonymity. Packet encryption in 
anonymity systems is done according to the onion routing, namely a packet is 
encrypted many times by the sender. When a relaying host receives such a packet, it 
decrypts and forwards the packet to the next hop [20]. By using onion routing, 
relaying hosts’ views are localized; i.e., a relaying host only knows the previous hop 
and next hop of the packets, but not the source or ultimate destination. Consequently, 
the information provided by a compromised relaying host to the adversary is reduced.  
1.4. Anonymity, Covert-Channel, and Side-Channel Attacks 
Current attacks against anonymity in communication systems can be categorized into 
five types: malware injection, passive traffic analysis, network watermarking, remote 
node analysis, and remote traffic analysis. The last three share the property that the 
adversary needs to insert or modify the network traffic, and therefore they can also be 
categorized as active traffic analysis. Except malware injection, anonymity attacks are 
either side-channel or covert-channel attacks, depending on the existence of an insider 




target information (i.e., information about a network node or the traffic on a 
communication link), 2) the access privileges of the adversary (i.e., insert traffic to 
the network, capture traffic from the network, and read node internal states), and 3) 
constraints (e.g., blocked by the firewall). To simplified the following discussion, we 
denote the above three kinds of access privileges as a write privilege to the network, 
a read privilege to the network, and a read privilege to the node.  As illustrated in 
Figure 2, the five types of anonymity attacks will be briefly described followed by a 
comparison. 
 
Figure 2. Adversary models of current anonymity attacks 
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1. Malware Injection.  An adversary injects malware to a target network end-
node so that the traffic of any communication link connected to this node will 
be revealed. For a communication link of interest, the adversary should have a 
read privilege for one end-node. But malware injection has limitations on the 
software protection mechanisms and scalability [47]. Modern operating 
systems in the network end-nodes may use a confined environment, such as a 
sandbox or virtual machine, to provide access control. Therefore, installed 
malware may not get enough system privileges (e.g., phones which are not 
“jail-broken”), to obtain communication records. In addition, the system 
administrator may apply integrity checks for the network end-nodes software 
such that only the authenticated and authorized software can be installed in the 
network nodes. On the other hand, a firewall or practically-equivalent network 
address translation (NAT) devices reduces the chance of remote malware 
injection.  
2. Passive Traffic Analysis. This attack monitors the traffic of a network and 
extracts information from the (encrypted) traffic  [20, 66, 70, 71, 76, 80]. 
Depending on the adversary model, the adversary may be able to capture 
traffic in every communication link as a global eavesdropper (equivalently, 
the adversary may capture traffic on both ends of a communication link of 
interest), or more realistically, the adversary may capture only the traffic in 
some of the communication links. In any case, the adversary needs to have 
read privilege on both ends of the communication link for a communication 




anonymity system and therefore the traffic captured at one end cannot be 
directly associated with the traffic captured on the other end.  From the 
captured traffic, the adversary can correlate the traffic captured in the two 
ends of a communication link (e.g., via packet counting, or frequency), to 
confirm that the traffic is actually linked. For example, Srivasta et al. confirm 
the existence of VoIP calls by correlating flows, and require a global 
adversary who knows the number of flows between nodes (including VoIP 
nodes) to attack an anonymous network [71]. The adversary can also use 
probabilistic models (e.g., Hidden Markov Models) to extract the content of 
communications from the captured traffic [76]. However, the assumption that 
the adversary has read privileges to both ends of the communication link is 
not always practical. For example, mobility brings high dynamics to the 
network end-node addresses and a network end-node may have multiple 
access channels to connect to the network (e.g., a smartphone can connect to 
the Internet by 3G or WiFi). These multiple channels make correlations 
difficult. 
3. Network Watermarking. The adversary encodes information in the traffic at 
one end of a communication link and decodes signals at the other end, in order 
to confirm the traffic on this communication link. For a communication link 
of interest, the adversary should have a read privilege to one end and a write 
privilege to the other end. In Wang, Chen and Jajodia’s watermarking attack, 
the adversary perturbs and monitors the timing of the VoIP flows between a 




perturbed packet transmission time enables the adversary to link one VoIP call 
with another. In Murdoch’s attack, watermarking is used to reveal the identity 
of a hidden server in the Tor anonymous network [53].  Through the Tor 
network, a node, as a hidden server, can provide a service without revealing 
its IP address and other nodes can access the service through a pseudonym. 
The adversary probes the hidden server with watermarked packets (i.e., write 
privilege on the network); meanwhile, the adversary probes possible relaying 
hosts (i.e., read privilege on the network) and if the responses from a relaying 
host match the watermark, this relaying host is determined to be included on 
the path between the adversary node and the hidden server. The network 
watermarking attack has the limitation that the adversary must have read 
privileges to one end of the communication link and write privileges to the 
other end.  
4. Remote Node Analysis. An adversary probes a remote network end-node to 
obtain this node’s type or internal state. Such information about a node can be 
used to degrade or break the sender or recipient anonymity by giving the 
adversary the ability to link a pseudonym for this node to its real identity. The 
adversary needs to have both read and write privileges to one end of a 
communication link to obtain the private information about a network end-
node at the other end of this link. This attack can obtain the private 
information for a remote node, but cannot, at least directly, confirm the traffic 
of a communication link. In Murdoch’s temperature channel, the adversary, at 




hidden server in the Tor anonymous network [54]. The adversary then 
analyzes the timing of the response packets. By varying the packet rate, the 
target end-node will have different CPU loads that result in different clock 
skews because of the temperature changes. Clock skews can be calculated 
from the timing of response packets. Meanwhile, the adversary can measure 
the clock skew of a set of candidate hosts using the same probing mechanism. 
The adversary can further obtain the identity of the target end-node by 
comparing clock skews. Operating-system fingerprinting is another attack of 
this type [24, 57]. The adversary sends carefully-designed packets to the target 
network end-nodes, and different types of responses can be used to distinguish 
different kinds of operating systems or TCP/IP protocol stacks.  
Another type of attack discovers the parameters of remote hosts. Barbuzzi, 
Ricciato, and Boggia conjectured that probing phones can obtain the state 
machine parameters of radio resource management in the 3G mobile 
communication system [5]. Their conjecture was then confirmed by Perala et 
al. who compared empirical results with a telecommunication traffic analyzer 
[60]. This technique was then systematized by Qian et al. [64]. Discovered 
parameters are used to improve the mobile application performance [3, 45], 
improve the simulation accuracy, or to optimize the paging attack, which is a 
denial of service attack [5]. In another attack, Fu et al. probed network end-
nodes and used the response time to infer the system load for the target end-
nodes [23]. The constraint of this type of attacks is that the obtained private 




5. Remote Traffic Analysis. This type of attack is a special case for remote node 
analysis when the adversary probes the target end-node and infers the traffic 
from the probing responses. Blond et al.’s attack concurrently probed a host 
through both the Skype (VoIP) and BitTorrent (P2P file sharing) protocols. 
The target host should have a public IP address or the open ports in its 
network address translation (NAT) devices [6]. When a host is behind NAT, it 
may share the same public IP address with others. Based on the assumption 
that some TCP/IP implementations still use a predictable identification field in 
IP headers, if the IP headers in Skype and BitTorrent probing response 
packets contain identification fields with close values, the Skype user is 
detected as the BitTorrent user. This attack is limited due to the requirements 
that the identification field is predictable and the fact that the NAT Port is 
open. The former requirement is already well-known as a security 
vulnerability and the latter may be disabled by those who use strict security 
policies.  
In another remote traffic analysis attack by Gong, Kiyavash, and Borisov, the 
adversary probes a DSL router with ICMP packets and uses the time series of 
response time as the fingerprint for the website accessed by a computer served 
by the router [27]. However, their approach does not deal with noise and 
randomness. They used Dynamic Time Warping (DTW) distance to match the 
observed time series and multiple time series of different websites which were 
recorded previously. Although DTW can identify shifted and stretched 




that are the realization of the same random process are regarded as different, 
even though they have the same probabilistic properties. Furthermore, if two 
computers access the Internet using the same DSL router, the pattern in time 
series data is likely to be heavily distorted and not recognizable. Moreover, 
ICMP blocking is a standard function in modern network devices and 
therefore such attacks can be avoided. Another constraint of this attack is that 
when two websites have the same communication content, the adversary is 
unable to distinguish which one is actually involved in the communication.  
Therefore, this approach cannot be extended to VoIP, whose traffic is alike. 
These above attacks, except the malware injection, are either side-channel attacks or 
covert-channel attacks. The passive traffic analysis is a side-channel attack because 
the adversary only gets information from a position outside the system and there is no 
insider adversary. The network watermarking is a covert-channel attack because an 
adversary needs to encode and hide information into the traffic and the other 
adversary needs to decode this hidden information.  The remote node analysis and 
remote traffic analysis are side-channel attacks because an adversary needs no inside 
help to obtain the inside information.  
By comparing these attacks, we can find that remote traffic analysis, while still 
exhibiting some limitations, is a promising attack for breaching the anonymity of 
communication records because it analyzes the traffic “remotely”. Malware injection 
can be defeated by software integrity checks. Passive traffic analysis and 




needs to have read or write privileges to both ends of the communication link of 
interest (i.e., not remote attacks). Remote node analysis can reveal the node identity 
but cannot confirm the traffic on communication links. Remote traffic analysis 
enables the adversary to obtain the traffic information where the adversary does not 
have direct read or write access to the traffic or the corresponding nodes. However, 
the remote traffic analysis schemes cannot go beyond a firewall/NAT and has a 
problem in identifying the communication pattern when two communication links 
associated with the same end-node have the same type of content. In contrast, our 
approach is to combine remote traffic analysis and passive traffic analysis so that the 
adversary can obtain the “remote” read privileges to the both ends of the 
communication link of interest.  
1.5. The Private Communication Detection (PCD) Problem  
Based on the analysis of extant research and the use of covert channels and side 
channels, we propose the private communication detection (PCD), a communication 
anonymity attack whose adversary has the same capabilities as the remote traffic 
analysis but can perform powerful traffic correlation among all communication links 
in the same way as a passive global eavesdropper. In the remote traffic analysis’ 
attack model, the adversary does not need to have any special capability above an 
ordinary network user (i.e., although the adversary needs to have read and write 
privileges on the network, the adversary does not need to have direct access 
privileges to the communication link of interest).  However, since the remote traffic 




communication links associated with the same target end-node may transmit the same 
content (e.g., VoIP calls have the same call-setup procedures and constant-rate 
streaming), the adversary is unable to identify which communication link actually has 
traffic. If the adversary can observe both ends of the communication link of interest, 
via the passive traffic analysis, she will overcome the above problem because she can 
correlate the traffic on both ends of the communication link of interest. In short, this 
correlation enables an adversary to detect private communication between the two 
ends of a communication link, and hence to breach communication privacy without 
any special wiretapping capabilities.  
1.5.1. The Problem 
We first consider the simplest form of Private Communication Detection (PCD), 
which contains only two targets and one adversary. PCD with more than two targets 
will be discussed in Section 1.6. As illustrated in Figure 3, the PCD adversary model 
composes an adversary, goal, and capabilities. 
Adversary Goal: Can adversary Eve obtain the communication pattern (e.g., call 
time, length, and frequency) of two target users, Alice and Bob?  
Adversary Capabilities: Eve is an ordinary network user without special 
capabilities, such as malware injection, control of infrastructure, or 
eavesdropping. Eve can only send packets to Alice and Bob, and receive timely 





Figure 3. The definition of PCD adversary 
 
Figure 4. The simplified PCD adversary model on the read/write privilege 
In this setting, the private communications between Alice and Bob can be based on an 
anonymity system, if such a system is able to satisfy the requirements for this 
communication (e.g., VoIP requires low latency low jitter). The inaccessibility (e.g., 
physically-secured) of traffic to adversary Eve makes the communication between 
Alice and Bob private to Eve. Therefore, we assume the communications between 
Alice and Bob are a type of “private communication”, which is a more general case 
than the anonymity system case. 
In order to make a more explicit comparison with the other anonymity attacks defined 
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difference between PCD and remote traffic analysis (e.g., Gong et al.’s remote traffic 
analysis) is that the PCD adversary infers the private communication between two 
target network end-nodes. It gives PCD a network-wide view. For example, in Gong 
et al.’s remote traffic analysis, the node to which the target end-node connects is 
actually inferred by the fingerprint of the communication contents. In that case, the 
target end-node may connect one of two nodes with the same contents. Hence the 
adversary is unable to distinguish which node is actually connected by the target end-
node. We illustrate the relationship between PCD and other anonymity attacks in 
Figure 5. This figure illustrates the role of PCD in active remote traffic analysis, 
along with remote node analysis, network watermarking, and remote traffic analysis.  
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PCD has two unique properties as follows. 
1. PCD can monitor any link in the network without direct access. Other attacks, 
including passive traffic analysis and network watermarking attacks, require 
the adversary to have read or write privileges on at least one end of the 
communication link of interest. 
2. The information that is of interest in PCD, the communication pattern between 
two end-nodes, implies that PCD needs to have a high time resolution. In 
other words, PCD concerns the short-term relationships (e.g. a voice call may 
last only tens of seconds) between targets, but not the long-term relationships 
(e.g., friendship). However, the knowledge of short-term communications can 
allow us to infer the long-term relationship as well. Current privacy attacks in 
anonymous networks cannot, and are not intended to be used for call detection 
since they require longer data acquisition times than an entire call, which may 
only last for seconds or minutes [18, 53, 54]. By using the obtained 
communication patterns of short-term communications, an adversary Eve can 
also perform link analysis (Viz., Figure 3) and determine the strength of ties 
between Alice and Bob.  The tie strength can be accurately measured by 
interaction frequency, evidence of recent communication, communication 
reciprocity, and the existence of at least one mutual friend in linking the two 
target parties [25]. 
Whenever PCD is achievable, it enables an ordinary network user without special 




user of a perfectly anonymous network [18, 61, 62]). For example, a foreign agent 
might want to collect call records of secure (e.g., malware-free) smartphones of 
targeted US government officials or a spouse may want to discover if his/her 
significant other is developing an undesirably strong relationship (tie) with a third 
party. The question of whether ordinary users can collect call records gains further 
relevance in anticipating future secure networks, which will undoubtedly provide 
anonymity despite wiretapping, as well as secure communication devices, which rule 
out the remote insertion of malware that could operate in an undetectable manner. 
1.5.2. A New Type of Side Channels and Relationship Inference 
The achievability of PCD relies on two techniques, namely a new type of side 
channels and the ability to infer relationships. In the NSA’s Rainbow series (i.e., the 
series of security guidelines for trusted computing systems of U.S. Department of 
Defense), Gligor categorized a class of covert channels, including the 
abovementioned quantum-time channel, that exploit the shared resources [26].  Once 
an adversary can use certain shared resource (e.g., CPU, bus, and disk) and another 
adversary can observe the resource use, there exists a convert channel between the 
two adversaries. 
Although the covert channels caused by a shared resource have been extensively 






 outside cryptography. Surprisingly, we found that the side channels 
caused by a shared resource are the key to achieving PCD.  
 
Figure 6. Resource-contention side channels in PCD 
As shown in Figure 6, if certain (exclusive) shared resources are required for 
communication, the resources will both affect and be affected by the communication 
channel. Resource contention associates the private communication (between Alice 
and Bob) and the non-private communication (between Eve and Alice, or Eve and 
Bob). One example of a resource-contention side channel is provided when the radio 
channel is the shared resource under contention in a WiFi network. When a WiFi 
                                                 
1 It is easy to find a side channel in daily life. For example, imagine an apartment where a bathroom 
with two doors is located between the two bedrooms. In this case, a tenant living in one bedroom can 
indirectly observe the behavior of the other tenant with ease, because they both share the bathroom. 
Use of the shared resource, in this case, the light under the door or sound of the shower, provide easily 



















node intends to send a packet, it must use the radio channel according to the 
CSMA/CA protocol, such that if another node is transmitting or expected to transmit, 
the sending node must wait and will retry access (back-off) after a random amount of 
time. Therefore, the timing of one WiFi node’s traffic is influenced by another WiFi 
node’s traffic.  
The side channels caused by resource contention allow the PCD to distinguish 
whether there is traffic on a communication link. As shown in Figure 7, given the 
probing responses, the PCD adversary acts as a distinguisher that identifies whether 
there is traffic on a remote communication link at the time of probing. 
 
Figure 7. The PCD adversary is a distinguisher 
Due to the fact that a PCD adversary can probe (via read privileges on the network) 
the two ends of the private communication, PCD can actually infer the relationship 
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to Resig et al.’s work, where the “friendship” is inferred by the online/offline status 
of Instant Messaging users [68]. They hypothesized that if two users go online and go 
offline at about the same time, the two users may be friends. The difference between 
PCD and their work is that 1) in their scheme the user status (online/offline) is 
explicitly provided by the users, while in PCD the adversary must detect the status of 
end-nodes (which will be discussed in the next section), and 2) the “friendship” 
relationship in their work is long-term while the call-records under study here are 
short-term.  
1.6. Overview of the Proposed PCD Approaches 
We propose three PCD approaches using various probing techniques that exploit 
resource contention. The Resource-Saturation PCD exploits the resource contention 
inside network end-nodes; the Stochastic PCD utilizes the resource contention in the 
network; the Service-Priority PCD makes use of resource contention in different 
services. The three approaches are briefly described below and then compared in 
Table 1.  
Resource-Saturation PCD Approach (Chapter 2). In some VoIP phones, especially 
for those implemented with dedicated hardware (rather than software), a fixed-size 
buffer (the resource under contention) is used to store the context for VoIP protocol 
negotiation. By sending carefully designed packets2 to the phones, the adversary is 
able to determine whether a phone is busy because certain exceptions (e.g., no or 
                                                 




different responses) are signaled when the buffer is full. The adversary can then use 
the following principle to infer the call records: When two phones become busy 
during the same period, it is likely3 that they could communicate during that period. 
We analyzed this approach successfully on Cisco, LinkSys, and Grandstream VoIP 
phones, despite the fact that source code is unavailable. However, this approach 
requires an extensive, time-consuming protocol analysis and applying it to a new 
protocol/device may require redesigning the probe packets.  
Stochastic PCD Approach (Chapter 3). The shortcomings of Resource-Saturation 
PCD are overcome by the Stochastic PCD approach, which periodically probes the 
targets and classifies the time series of the response times using stochastic models. 
While stochastic models deal with the randomness in the random-access networks 
(e.g., a WiFi node’s back-off time is a random variable), the challenge lies in 
removing the noise (network jitter) introduced by the Internet switching, application 
server, and other nodes in the same network. By reducing the noise through signal 
processing, the performance in terms of detection accuracy is improved significantly. 
We employed this approach in two applications: Instant Messaging and WiFi. The 
shared resources exploited are the keyboard and radio channel, respectively. The 
Stochastic PCD can also be used for the practical detection of Sybil attacks [46, 55]. 
Service-Priority PCD Approach (Chapter 4). The last and most powerful PCD attack 
is performed against smartphones. Mobile communication systems, such as the 3G 
                                                 





UMTS and 2G GSM/GPRS, provide voice and data services through circuit and 
packet switching, respectively. Due to the limited radio resource (the resource under 
contention), voice service is given a higher priority than data service. Therefore, the 
adversary can repeatedly probe a phone and detect whether it is busy according to the 
delayed or lost responses. The adversary can then correlate the busy status to infer the 
call records in the same way as the Resource-Saturation PCD. We employed this 
attack in AT&T’s 3G and 2G networks. In addition, sending probes to smartphones 
can not only surreptitiously discover the call records but also can perform a denial of 
service attack on 2G smartphones. Probing 2G phones with short intervals (e.g., 1sec) 
will block the paging channel and the incoming/outgoing service becomes inactive, 
without providing an explicit error that the user can detect. 
Our proposed PCD approaches not only achieve anonymity breach in four separate 
applications (WiFi, Instant Messaging, VoIP, smartphones) but also suggest other 
candidate applications for PCD. Resource-Saturation PCD is suitable for 
communication systems where each network end-node (e.g., phone) uses a certain 
limited-quantity resource (e.g., fixed-size buffer, semaphores, or threads) to establish 
a communication session. The used resource is released upon the end of the 
communication session. Stochastic PCD works most effectively when the chosen 
stochastic models can accurately model random-access networks (e.g., Markov 
Chains can model CSMA/CA networks) and when signal-processing techniques can 
eliminate much of the noise in the probe responses. The Service-Priority PCD will 
also work on a communication system that provides two or more kinds of services 




Table 1. Summary of three proposed PCD approaches 
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(1 second intervals or 
less) 
Methodology Sending special probe 
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buffer 
Classifying response 
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stochastic models and 
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*
: These numbers are simply the data collecting interval for samples. The intervals can be lower (i.e., 
higher time resolution) 
 
The time resolution, namely how often the adversary can obtain the busy status or the 
communication pattern, is an important parameter for PCD. The higher the time 
resolution, the more accurate the communication pattern readings. The Resource-
Saturation PCD and Service-Priority PCD can achieve a very fine-grained time 
resolution (1-2 seconds). In that case, the number of probe messages required to 
successfully obtain the busy status in both PCD approaches will range between 1 and 
7. The time resolution of the Stochastic PCD is much lower because more responses 




resolution is that the higher the time resolution, the lower the false detection rate, as 
shown in the next section. 
1.7. PCD with More Targets 
The two-target PCD can easily be extended to monitor more targets. This can be 
implemented by performing two-target PCD on each pair of the monitored targets. 
The downside of this increased coverage is that one requires a greater awareness of 
the false detection problem. When Alice and Bob communicate with third parties, 
false detection occurs if the adversary falsely identifies that there was a call between 
Alice and Bob when they actually communicated with third parties. Fortunately, false 
detection rates are insignificant in the Resource-Saturation PCD and Service-Priority 
PCD approaches; the Stochastic PCD approach has a special case solution. 
The rate of false detection due to third-party communications in all three approaches 
depends on the PCD time resolution. In Resource-Saturation PCD and Service-
Priority PCD, if Alice and Bob both have a single call during a one-hour period and 
the time resolution is 10 seconds, the false detection rate is 1.8% when the start time 
and the end time of the calls are uniform-distributed random variables (viz., Appendix 
I for details). The false-detection rate drops to 0.24% when the time resolution is 1 
second. For all practical purposes these false-detection rates are insignificant for call-
record collection. This is the case not only because these rates are extremely small but 
also because most call-record analyses require multiple instances of detected calls; 
e.g., strength-of-tie analysis requires call frequency and reciprocal initiation, and 




statistical confidence in the results obtained. 
Stochastic PCD approach typically needs a much longer probing interval than the 
other two approaches. Fortunately, the Stochastic PCD approach has a solution for the 
special case when the type of traffic between the targets and the third parties is 
different from that between the targets. This would be the case if, for example, the 
communication types among all  the targets and the third party included  web surfing, 
video streaming and SSH, whereas the traffic between the targets is VoIP. In this 
case, signal-processing techniques can help remove the effects of non-VoIP 
communications in performing the Stochastic PCD.   
1.8. Contributions 
The main contribution of this dissertation is the definition and realization of a new, 
powerful attack against call-record privacy, namely private communication detection 
(PCD). Not only can PCD be launched with only ordinary-user capabilities, but it 
succeeds with very high probability. Through PCD, an ordinary network user can 
obtain the communication pattern (e.g., call time, length, and frequency) without any 
of the typically-assumed special abilities, such as malware injection, control of the 
infrastructure, or eavesdropping. This new privacy attack is enabled by a new type of 
side channels caused by resource contention. The three approaches and the four 
applications illustrated herein show the generality of PCD and the resource-
contention side channels.  Among various countermeasures, we describe a general 
defense against PCD toward active probing by monitoring and blocking periodic 




The Resource-Saturation PCD approach not only indicates that a fixed-size buffer in a 
VoIP phone can result in private information leakage, but also implies that other 
shared resources, such as operating system resources (e.g., semaphores, number of 
threads) may enable privacy breaches in communication systems.  Moreover, we 
tested our attack in closed-source commercial VoIP phones, which do not provide any 
implementation documentation, and the attack success here provides a fact that 
provides further testimony for the practicality of the attacks. 
In Stochastic PCD, we show that PCD is enabled by timing side channels caused by 
different types of resource contention in end nodes.  Exploitation of these timing 
channels from PCD is effective despite network and proxy-generated noise (e.g., 
jitter, delays). The Stochastic PCD approach also suggests that the traditional 
countermeasure to side-channel attacks, adding noise, would not be effective when 
the adversary is able to eliminate this added noise through well-developed, existing 
signal-processing techniques. We use a stochastic analysis to demonstrate how PCD 
exploits indirectly accessible end-node resources, such as WiFi radio channels and 
computer keyboards in Instant Messaging. Similar analysis enables practical Sybil 
node detection.  
The Service-Priority PCD is adversary-friendly: simple application programs can 
perform automatic probing and relatively unskilled users can visually recognize the 
pattern of probe responses returned when a smartphone is engaged in a call. The 
attack is illustrated in a real environment where an iPhone and a Google Nexus One 




denial of service attack on phones that use a 2G network, where frequent probing is 
able to prevent the voice service signals (e.g., paging) from being delivered. Without 
any explicit error a user would recognize as an attack, outgoing calls fail to connect 
and incoming calls will fail to ring through to the user’s device. 
1.9. Dissertation Organization 
In the rest of this dissertation, we describe the PCD context, methodology, and 
results. We illustrate the Resource-Saturation PCD approach in Chapter 2, Stochastic 
PCD approach in Chapter 3, and Service-Priority PCD approach in Chapter 4. Each 
PCD approach is applied to one or two applications, including the protocol analysis 
and the evaluation. Chapter 5 discusses the countermeasures to PCD. Finally, the 





Chapter 2: Resource-Saturation PCD 
In this chapter, we propose the Resource-Saturation PCD approach that performs a 
PCD attack against VoIP phones by exploiting the fixed-size buffer that stores the 
protocol negotiation context. This approach was developed by analyzing both the 
protocol specification and implementation. The main challenge is to perform the 
attack without alerting the users, because the probe messages that can be used to 
saturate the fixed-size buffer may also be the messages used to set up calls. The work 
in this chapter was previously reported in [35].  
2.1. Overview 
Problem Statement. In Figure 8, attack targets Alice and Bob establish a VoIP 
session. The session can be delivered over one or more forwarding proxies to provide 
anonymity, if its latency satisfies the needs of VoIP (i.e., <400ms latency 
recommended by ITU-T G.114; longer latency tolerance for tactical environments) 
[17, 20, 34, 39]. The forwarding proxies can be implemented in the network layer, 
transport layer, or application layer.  Adversary Eve’s goal is to discover whether 
Alice and Bob call each other using the VoIP network, the duration of the 






Figure 8. Revealing call records in a private VoIP network 
 
 
Figure 9. Adversary capabilities  
Our adversary Eve does not need any added capabilities beyond those of an ordinary 
user. As shown in Figure 9, she can send probe VoIP packets to the target phones and 
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capabilities.  Yet her probing is undetectable4 by the end-users of the target phones 
unless the phone logs or network traffic are analyzed; i.e., her packets alert neither 
Alice nor Bob that their phones are being probed remotely.  
 
Figure 10. Attack steps 
Our Approach. The simplest attack consists of the two steps illustrated in Figure 10. 
In the first step, Eve detects whether both Alice’s phone and Bob’s are busy; i.e., she 
performs busy-status detection for both phones. In the second step, Eve verifies 
whether Alice’s phone and Bob’s are busy, or not busy, at around the same time; i.e., 
she performs call correlation. If the phones’ busy statuses correlate, then Alice and 
Bob probably have a VoIP call during Eve’s probing period. Note that the busy-status 
detection should be undetectable (not alerting the phone end-users), otherwise the 
end-users of the target phones can easily recognize the anomaly and stop using these 
phones.  
                                                 
4 We assume the unsuspecting end-user of a target phone accesses the phone via the handset, hook, 
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Resource contention makes it possible to detect a phone’s busy status in a VoIP 
network. The resource, named the protocol buffer, is used to store the contexts of the 
VoIP protocol negotiation. Certain VoIP packets (e.g., call-setup packets) create a 
state machine in both the caller and callee phones. The context of the state machine, 
including the status and timer, is stored in a slot of the protocol buffer. When the 
desired action is completed or times out, the buffer slot occupied by the call is 
released. Call-termination packets can expedite buffer slot release if the buffer slots 
are occupied due to call-setup packets.   
In some VoIP phones, including those implemented with dedicated hardware, the 
protocol buffer is a fixed-size array. As expected, fixed-size protocol buffers can 
cause resource contention. For example, in a protocol buffer containing N slots, the 
call setup occupies 1 slot and the remaining N-1 slots are available for other protocol 
instantiations. This implies that if the adversary can detect the number of available 
protocol buffer slots, she can determine a phone’s busy status. She can do this by 
periodically sending VoIP packets, which would overflow all available protocol 
buffer slots of the target phone, and detecting whether a full-buffer condition is 
signaled back. By examining the response to a full-buffer condition, the adversary can 
count the number of available protocol buffer slots in a target phone. This enables the 
adversary to detect the phone’s busy status in a matter of seconds – much faster than 
with any of the current eavesdropping/flow-analysis methods. Rapid busy-status 
detection makes our attack feasible in any VoIP networks. For our privacy attack 
experiments, we selected the IETF Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), which has been 
widely adopted by the telecommunication industry, the military, cable operators, and 




2.2. The Attack 
In this section, we provide an overview of SIP with an emphasis on the mechanisms 
related to SIP resource-contention side channels. Then we show how busy-status 
detection is enabled by four side channels that we found by testing closed-source 
commercial VoIP phones. (The reader who is familiar with the IETF SIP 
specification can skip Section 2.2.1.  below.) 
2.2.1. Call Setup and Termination Overview 
SIP is a HTTP-like application-layer protocol designed for VoIP signaling and other 
applications that require devices to setup/terminate sessions to exchange information 
Figure 11. SIP uses a transaction as its basic message exchange component. A 
transaction is composed of a request message, optional provisional response 
messages, and a final response message. In this chapter we use the terms transaction 
and request interchangeably in the case where the request represents the transaction 
itself. The communication initiated by the caller to a callee’s phone can be relayed by 
one or more SIP proxy servers. Relaying, which is typically used for billing, 






Figure 11. SIP call setup and termination 
In Figure 11, we illustrate a call setup (Transaction 1) and termination (Transaction 2) 
in SIP. In Transaction 1, the caller first sends an INVITE request to the callee. A SIP 
request message includes three parts. The first part contains the method name, such as 
INVITE, to describe the main purpose of this request. The second part contains 
headers, which specify attributes (e.g. To: sip:wj@iptel.org). The third, and optional, 
part is the payload, which usually includes media parameters encoded by the Session 
Description Protocol (SDP). When the INVITE request is received, the callee’s phone 
rings, and immediately sends a provisional response, such as “180 RINGING,” to the 
caller. (SIP responses are identified by a 3-digit number.) Responses with a hundreds 
digit of value 1 are called the “provisional responses” (denoted 1xx in SIP 





transaction. In Transaction 1, the callee decides to answer this call by picking up the 
handset, so the callee’s phone sends back “200 OK” in response to the original 
INVITE request. “200 OK” is among the “final responses”, which are specified by 
codes with digits that do not begin with a 1 (i.e., 200-699 in SIP specification). 
After the caller sends an ACK request, the caller and the callee have already reached 
an agreement on the media parameters for establishing a voice channel by a streaming 
protocol such as RTP.  Eventually one of the two parties (in this case, the callee) will 
terminates the call by initiating Transaction 2 with a BYE request. The other party 
replies using a “200 OK”, which terminates the voice channel. 
 
Figure 12. A non-INVITE transaction at the server side 
SIP defines the roles of server and client. When a SIP protocol side receives SIP 





receives SIP responses, it acts as a client. Four state machines are defined to describe 
the general behavior of INVITE and non-INVITE transactions for SIP clients and 
server roles.  Method-specific behavior is based on the four state machines. In Figure 
12, we illustrate one of the four state machines for a non-INVITE transaction on the 
server side.  When the SIP phone (a Transaction User) receives a non-INVITE 
transaction, such as BYE or OPTIONS, it enters the Trying state and creates a 
transaction instance. After sending the provisional responses (1xx), it enters the 
Proceeding state. If the SIP phone (i.e., user) decides to send out a final response 
(200-699), it enters the Completed state. When Timer J signals a time-limit exceeded 
event or there is a transport layer error, the state machine ends up in the Terminated 
state and the transaction expires. By default, Timer J is set to 32 seconds for UDP and 
0 seconds for TCP/SCTP.5 Timer J also helps SIP to handle packets lost in UDP via 
retransmission.  
2.2.2. Busy-status Detection 
Side Channel. Like other stateful protocols, SIP needs a protocol buffer for storing 
the protocol negotiation context for each transaction. In some SIP phones, especially 
for those implemented through dedicated hardware (i.e., hardware SIP phones), the 
protocol buffer is implemented as a fixed-size array for two reasons. First, SIP phones 
generally do not need a large protocol buffer since they are not expected to receive 
dozens of calls per second. Second, if the protocol buffer is a simple fixed-size array, 
                                                 
5 SIP standards require both UDP and TCP to be implemented, but UDP is generally more popular than 





the SIP phone can recover from buffer flooding automatically, after the flooding 
packets are gone.  In contrast, if the protocol buffer is allocated on demand, recovery 
is more complex, as the SIP phone may enter unrecoverable states (e.g., kernel panic) 
due to unreleased, used-up memory. The disadvantage is that, this fixed-size array 
enables an adversary to count the number of available slots in the protocol buffer and 
tell whether a VoIP session exists; i.e., the adversary is able to tell whether a buffer 
slot is used and the phone is busy.  The adversary exploits this side channel to detect 
calls surreptitiously.  
Detection Algorithm. Let N be the size of the protocol buffer. To count the number of 
available buffer slots, the adversary sends N+1 SIP request (i.e., probes) to the target 
phone, one every d time units. d is chosen to be small enough so that no request could 
expire and free up a slot before the last request is received. In some SIP 
implementations, when the buffer becomes full, the phone ignores the next request, 
whereas in others it returns an error. Suppose the protocol buffer size has h available 
slots before the adversary begins sending requests. If the phone ignores the request 
arriving after the protocol buffer is full, the adversary will not receive the h+1
st
 
response, as shown in Figure 13 (a). In the other case, the adversary will receive an 
error response for the h+1
st
 request, such as  “486 Busy Here,” as shown in Figure 13 






Figure 13. Possible target-phone responses when the protocol buffer is full 
Detection Side Effects. If the SIP phone, or proxy in the transmission path, supports 
retransmission, the adversary will get a delayed positive response to the h+1
st
 request 
after the protocol buffer slot becomes free.  However, the delay is several seconds or 
less, and cannot affect busy-status detection. 
Another side effect arises because whenever the protocol buffer becomes full, the 
phone is disabled for a period of time, which we call the disabled period. For 
example, our experiments with two phones show that the disabled period is close to 
30 seconds (with parameters d=80ms, N=6 for 7940G, N=32 for PAP2). The details 
of the calculation are shown in Appendix III.  However, during the disabled period, 
the target phone does not answer a caller’s setup request. Only after the disabled 
period ends the target phone can receive a call setup request issued by the 






the target-phone user to perceive a small ring delay. However, as described later, it is 
possible to shorten the disabled period in some phones such that the target-phone user 
will experience almost no ring delay.  
Target-Undetectable Probe Requests. Since we used closed-source hardware phones, 
we had to find SIP methods and parameters that could be used as probes for busy-
status detection, experimentally.  Suitable SIP requests (i.e., probes) must fill the 
protocol buffer and yet must not alert the targeted user (e.g., by phone rings) that an 
attack is in progress. We experimented with all SIP methods on the closed-source4 
phones and found that OPTIONS, INVITE, NOTIFY, and UPDATE methods are 
suitable for implementing adversary probes. In describing the suitable SIP requests, 
we use the naming convention “METHOD-type,” such as “INVITE-require” or 
“OPTIONS-ordinary” below.  These SIP requests are discussed below. Examples of 
actual SIP-request messages are given in Appendix II. 
1) INVITE-require and INVITE-SDP requests. As described in Section 2.1, the 
INVITE transaction performs the call setup. By default, upon receiving an ordinary 
INVITE request, the SIP phone alerts (rings) the user. If this were always the case, 
the INVITE transaction could not be used to perform busy-status detection. However, 
an INVITE request that is invalid for making a call will not ring, and hence could be 
used for busy-status detection.  We found two types of INVITE requests with this 
capacity, namely INVITE-require and INVITE-SDP. 
We use an INVITE-require request with Require header whose functionality is not 




INVITE request requires the callee to support an extension named 100rel. If the callee 
does not support the requested function, the callee responds immediately without 
alerting the user, but a protocol-buffer slot still remains allocated in the callee’s 
phone. Hence, an INVITE request with a header “Require:xx” is suitable for busy-
status detection. Similarly, the INVITE-SDP request can also attach an invalid SDP 
message in the INVITE request (e.g., an incomplete/invalid IP address in SDP). The 
INVITE with SDP is a commonly used request since a call setup needs to exchange 
media parameters through several SDP messages attached in the call-setup messages 
[32].  
Disabled-Period Shortening. For busy-status detection using the INVITE method, 
there is a way to shorten the disabled period dramatically; i.e., to less than 2 seconds. 
To do this we use ACK requests, which terminate the INVITE transactions. Call 
setup is a three-way handshake, including an INVITE request (caller to callee), 
INVITE response (callee to caller), and ACK request (caller to callee), as shown in 
Figure 4. Since an INVITE request occupies a protocol buffer slot, an ACK request 
would release that buffer slot. Hence, as soon as the adversary receives all INVITE 
responses from the callee, it can send the ACK requests to force the freeing of the 
occupied protocol-buffer slots.  
2) OPTIONS-ordinary request. An ordinary (no special header needed) OPTIONS 
request can also serve as busy-status detection probe. An OPTIONS request is used to 
query the protocol capability of a SIP device, and can be used as a trace route tool. 
The adversary sends the OPTIONS requests to the phone and they will occupy the 




3) NOTIFY-check-sync and NOTIFY-refer requests. SIP provides an asynchronous 
event-notification scheme for signaling events (e.g. voice mail available) [33]. An 
event can be subscribed in advance and then will be delivered to a SIP phone. (The 
Internet’s IANA organization maintains the database of valid event parameters [30].) 
The events are sent via NOTIFY requests. Thus, the adversary simply sends NOTIFY 
requests with specific event identifiers (e.g. with the header “Event:refer”) to occupy 
the protocol buffer slots.  
4) UPDATE-ordinary request. The UPDATE method changes the media parameter 
during a call. The UPDATE method is seldom implemented, and thus it is possible 
that unsupported UPDATE requests (and other unsupported methods) can still occupy 
the SIP protocol-buffer slots and allow busy-status detection.  
2.2.3. Call Correlation 
Busy-status detection can obtain the busy status of a phone at a specific time. 
However, depending on the phone type, the busy-status detection can detect whether 
the phone is busy either 1) at any time during the call, or 2) only at the beginning 
and/or the end of the call.  
Hence, we define three tests for correlating busy status to infer a call. When both of 
the two target phones belong to the first type, we use the continuity test: the busy 
period of one phone (from time i to time j) should be close the busy status of another 
phone (from time x to y) such that |x-i|+|y-j|<ε, where ε is a constant indicating the 
upper-bound of measurement error. Otherwise, we use the weak or strong tests. The 




such that |x-i|<ε or |y-j|<ε. The strong test is that two target phones are both busy at 
the beginning and the end of the call such that |x-i|<ε and |y-j|<ε. 
2.3. The Attack Experiments 
We set up a simple VoIP network including three (hardware) SIP phones to perform 
the busy-status detection and call-correlation steps. For the busy-status detection, we 
show how the phones respond to the probe requests. For call correlations, we derive 
the detection rate. 
2.3.1. Environment 
We implemented a program named Voice Pulser6 to perform busy-status detection. 
Since the proposed attack does not require eavesdropping, we experimented on an 
ordinary LAN. Voice Pulser sent attack messages to the three phones, which were a 
Linksys PAP2, a Cisco 7940G, and a Grandstream BT-100. The PAP2 is a consumer-
level product which was bundled by Vonage, a major VoIP service provider. The 
7490G is a medium-level product that provides business phone features. Although 
Linksys is a division of Cisco, the PAP2 and 7940G use different protocol stacks and 
operating systems. The Grandstream BT-100 is an entry-level VoIP phone. 
Communication between the testing phones was relayed by a SIP proxy server. 
                                                 






2.3.2. Busy-status Detection  
2.3.2.1. Attacks based on INVITE 
We examined the phone responses under INVITE-require (PAP2 and 7940G) and 
INVITE-SDP (BT-100) attacks with two conditions, namely 1) when the phone did 
not receive or make a call (Not Busy), and 2) when the phone made or received a call 
and was still active on the line (Busy). Voice Pulser sent 33 and 7 attack SIP 
messages to the PAP2 and 7940G, respectively, according their protocol buffer sizes. 
We sent 23 attack SIP attack messages to the BT-100. Figure 15 shows how the PAP2 
received all 33 responses when it was not busy and missed the 33
rd
 response when it 
was busy. Figure 14 shows how 7940G responded with an error ‘486 Busy Here’ 
when the protocol buffer was full. Figure 16 shows that the BT-100 response, which 
was slightly different.  In the middle of the 23 probes, we made a call from BT-100. 
A SIP phone should add a tag to the To field when responding to a request. E.g., “To: 
wj@iptel.org” in a request becomes “To:wj@iptel.org;tag=aa69981” in the response 
[31]. The tag must be cryptographically random and globally unique (i.e., a nonce). 
When the BT-100 was not busy, the To tag was a nonce consisting of digits and 
letters. However, when the BT-100 was busy, the To tag was fixed.  
Based on the above observation, the adversary is able to determine the busy status of 
the PAP2 by finding out whether the 33
rd
 response is received, the busy status of 
7940G by finding out whether 6
th
 response is a “486 Busy Here”, and the busy status 
of the BT-100 by finding out whether two consecutive response have the same value 





Figure 14. Responses of 7940G under INVITE-require attack (as a callee) 
 
Figure 15. Responses of PAP2 under INVITE-require attack (as a callee) 









































































































Figure 16. Responses of BT-100 under INVITE-SDP attack (as a caller) 
2.3.2.2. Attacks 
We evaluated all types of attack messages listed in previous section and show the 
results in Table 2 and Table 3. Table 2 indicates whether the busy-status detection 
was successful. Table 3 provides details for the phones responses to the probe 
requests and how the busy status can be identified. 
Table 2. Phones against the attacks 
 Linksys 
PAP2  
Cisco 7940G  Grandstream BT-100 
OPTIONS-ordinary Success(S1) Fail(F2) Fail(F2) 
INVITE-require Success(S2)  Success(S4) * Fail(F1) 
INVITE-SDP Fail(F1) Success(S5) * Success(S6)
#
 
NOTIFY-refer Success(S1) Fail(F2) Fail(F3) 
NOTIFY-check-
sync 
Success(S1) Fail(F2) Fail(F3) 
UPDATE-ordinary Success(S3) Fail(F3) Fail(F3) 
*: Disabled period shortening is supported 
#: No disabled period 
 
 



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3. Explanation of Table 2 
Type How the SIP phone responds 
S1 “200 OK” response for first h requests 
No response for other requests  
h=32 if not busy; h=31 if busy 
S2 “420 Bad Extension” response for first h requests 
No response for other requests  
h=33 if not busy;  h=32 if busy 
S3 “501 Not Implemented” response for first h requests 
No response for other requests  
h=32 if not busy; h=31 if busy 
S4  “420 Bad Extension” response for first h requests 
“486 Busy here” response for other requests 
h=6 if not busy; h=5 if busy 
S5  “500 Internal Server Error” response for first h requests 
 “486 Busy here” response for other requests 
h=6 if not busy; h=5 if busy 
S6 The To tag in the response is a nonce if not busy;  
The To tag in the response is a fixed value if busy 
h=1; no disabled period 
 
When the phone is busy as the caller, To tag consists of digits and upper-
case letters; 
When the phone is busy as the callee, To tag consists of digits and lower-
case letters. 
F1 The phone rings 
F2  “200 OK” response for all requests 
F3  Other responses (415, 401, 501, etc.) 
The PAP2 phone had different responses to different request probes. It responded 
with “200 OK” to OPTIONS-ordinary, NOTIFY-refer and NOTIFY-check-sync 
attacks. Even though refer and check-sync events are not supported by PAP2, for 
NOTIFY-refer and NOTIFY-check-sync, it responded “200 OK” as well. For the 
INVITE-require probe, PAP2 rejected the request with message “420 Bad Extension” 
because the requested extension “xx” is not supported. Since the UPDATE method is 
not supported by the PAP2, for UPDATE-ordinary, it responded with “501 Not 
Implemented.” It is noteworthy that the protocol buffer size N of PAP2 has a different 
value (N=33 instead of 32) in the INVITE-require request probe. This due to the fact 




The 7940G phone allows busy-status detection for only INVITE-based attack 
messages. We believe that the designers of the 7940G tried to avoid any unnecessary 
resource usage so that all requests, except those of the INVITE method, avoid filling 
the protocol buffer. Ironically, their conservative resource-management design 
enables disabled-period shortening.  
The BT-100 phone is only vulnerable to INVITE-SDP. In contrast with the other 
phones, the adversary can easily identity whether a BT-100 phone is the caller or 
callee. The To tag consists of upper-case letters characters when the phone is the 
caller; the To tag consists of lower-case letters when the phone is the callee. Another 
difference is that the BT-100 phone does not have a disabled period such that attack 
messages do not occupy the protocol buffer slots but busy status is still revealed.  
2.3.2.3. Response-Time Behavior 
It is also important to know how often the busy-status detection can be performed. 
We used several different probing intervals and found the minimum values as shown 
in Table 4. The adversary can probe the PAP2 phone with a 34 seconds interval, the 
7940G phone with a 2 seconds interval (when the disabled period is shortened), the 
BT-100 with a 3 seconds interval  (no disabled period). These values are the time 
resolution of the Resource-Saturation PCD.  
The disabled period also affects the ring delay, which is the time between call setup 
and ring. Table 4 also shows the ring delay. While the PAP2 phone has a longer ring 
delay under attack, the 7940G and the BT-100 have no significant ring delay under 
attack. For all three phones, the ring delay is essentially negligible for end-users 




Table 4. Timing behavior of busy-status detection 






Minimum Probing Interval (Time resolution) 34s 2s 3s 
Ring delay under attack
*









#: The phone rings immediately such that the investigator cannot differentiate the ring delay between different tests 
2.3.3. Call Correlation 
A phone has four possible roles. For a call setup, a phone can either send the setup 
request (call-setup initiator) or receive it (call-setup recipient). Similarly, for call 
termination, a phone can either send the termination request (call-termination 
initiator) or receive it (call-termination recipient). 
 
Figure 17. A call correlation experiment: 7940G calls PAP2 at 360sec and terminates at 700sec 
(7940G as call setup initiator and call termination initiator) 
 
0 200 400 600 800 1000
time (sec)
Cisco 7940G (caller)






First, we used the following steps to demonstrate a scenario of call correlation in 
Figure 17. The 7940G called the PAP2 after Voice Pulser had started, at 360 seconds, 
and the 7940G terminated the call at 700sec. For the 7940G phone (call-setup initiator 
and call-termination initiator), the phone revealed its busy status during the entire 
call. In contrast, the PAP2 phone (call-setup recipient and call-termination recipient) 
only showed it was busy when the call setup and call termination were performed.  
We then performed experiments where the three phones had different roles. The 
experimental steps are as follows:  
1. Use Voice Pulser to probe the PAP2 and the 7940G (or BT-100) concurrently 
for their busy status with a 34 seconds interval.  
2. Use one of the phones called the other. 
3. Pickup the callee phone after 10 seconds (before ring), or after it rings, if the 
call setup requires more than 10 seconds. 
4. Hang up the caller phone. 
Table 5 shows the results. For the detection rate, there was an outstanding case when 
the PAP2 received the call setup request.  The rate was 53%, instead of either 0% or 
100%. The reason is that the PAP2 phone has a non-negligible disabled period. In that 
case, whether the adversary could detect the call setup depends on the time when the 
call setup was performed. We performed 17 experiments, varying the call setup; i.e., 
the call setup was performed at 5 seconds increments (60, 65,…, 140) after the Voice 
Pulser started monitoring.  The timing spread over two Voice Pulser monitoring 




The 7940G and BT-100 phones achieved a 100% detection rate in all four roles. This 
means that if the adversary monitors 7940G or BT-100 phones, she will detect all 
VoIP calls between them via the continuity test. In contrast, the adversary will not be 
able to detect calls if a PAP2 phone is busy when it initiates or terminates a call. 
However, this finding does not imply that the PAP2 is invulnerable to our attack. If 
the adversary monitors a PAP2 phone and a 7940G (or BT-100) phone, she can still 
detect the VoIP calls between them, except in the case when the PAP2 calls the 
7940G (or BT-100) and the PAP2 terminates the call.  
Table 5 also shows that the false alarm rate was extremely low. To estimate the false 
alarm rates, we probed the phones continuously for over 13 hours (1459 probes). The 
PAP2 phone only had a 0.2% false alarm rate whereas the 7940G and BT-100 had a 
rate of 0%. 
Table 5. Performance of busy-status detection 
Type Role 
 
PAP2 7940G BT-100 
Detection rate Call-setup initiator(caller); sending INVITE request 0% 100% 100% 
Call-termination initiator; sending BYE request 0% 100% 100% 
Call-setup recipient(callee); receiving INVITE request 53%* 100% 100% 
Call-termination recipient; receiving BYE request 100% 100% 100% 
False alarm rate No actions 0.2% 0% 0% 
*: Tested by 17 samples 
 
We present the detection rates of call correlation for the 7940G and PAP2 in Table 6. 
Since the 7940G and BT-100 had the same detection rates in all roles, they are 
identical in deriving the detection rates of call correlation. In general, the detection 




PAP2. If the two target phones are 7940G (or BT-100) in case 6 of Table 6, then 
detection rate is 100%. In contrast, if the two target phones are both PAP2 (case 5 of 
Table 6), then the detection rate is 0%. If the two target phones are 7940G (or BT-
100) and PAP2, the detection rates depend on phones’ type and their roles in a call. 
Table 6. Detection rate of call correlation derived from Table 5 










initiator recipient Initiator recipient 
Case 1 PAP2 7940G
*
 PAP2 7940G N/A 0% 0% 
Case 2 PAP2 7940G 7940G PAP2 N/A 100% 0% 
Case 3 7940G PAP2 PAP2 7940G N/A 53% 0% 
Case 4 7940G PAP2 7940G PAP2 N/A 100% 53% 
Case 5 PAP2 PAP2 PAP2 PAP2 N/A 0% 0% 
Case 6 7940G 7940G 7940G 7940G 100% 100% 100% 
*: 7940G in this table can be replaced by BT-100 since they have same detection rate as shown in Table 5 
2.4. Summary 
We proposed an attack for discovering call records in a VoIP service. We analyzed 
the SIP protocol and discovered that array-based buffers of three commercially 
available closed-source hardware phones, which are used for storing protocol 
negotiation contexts, leak the busy status of a SIP phone. Through the leaked busy 
status of a callee’s phone, an adversary can easily detect the VoIP communication 






Chapter 3: Stochastic PCD 
In this chapter, we propose the Stochastic PCD approach that performs PCD attack 
against WiFi and Instant Messaging through the concept of classifying the response 
time series. The main challenge is to deal with the noise in the response time series 
introduced by Internet switching, application proxies, and other nodes in the same 
network. The proposed approach can also be used to detect the Sybil attacks. The 
work in this chapter was previously reported in [36]. 
3.1. Overview 
Problem Statement. Our network setting, abstractly shown in Figure 18 and Figure 19, 
illustrates the challenge faced by an ordinary user in performing PCD against two 
targeted network users. Ordinary user Eve sends repeated probe messages to Alice and 
Bob’s nodes and analyzes the timing of their responses to determine whether these 
nodes communicate with each other, or alternatively whether their nodes are 
implemented by the same physical network node (as in a Sybil node7 instance). The 
type of messages Eve sends will not alert Alice and Bob of Eve’s repeated probing. 
However, Eve faces two Stochastic PCD challenges. First, the network may have other 
third-party nodes that communicate with Alice and Bob’s nodes separately. As a 
consequence, the timing of Alice and Bob’s node response to Eve’s probe messages 
might be similar to those when Alice and Bob communicate with each other, and Eve 
                                                 
7 Sybil nodes are undesirable because they negatively affect resource allocation, bandwidth utilization 





must be able to distinguish the former from the latter case. Second, network routers and 
application-layer proxies8 located between Eve’s node and those of Alice and Bob, 
respectively, can introduce jitter and delays. Since most interactive WiFi applications 
require low latencies (e.g., ITU G.114 recommends under 400ms latency for voice 
communication), the jitter and delay incurred by such networks would not prevent an 




Figure 18. Private communication detection 
                                                 
8 Application-layer proxies enable mobility and provide some degree of privacy and security; e.g., a 
smartphone registering with a server ensures that messages will be forwarded to the phone (mobility) 
and the phone’s IP address is hidden (privacy). Moreover, a phone receives a packet only through a 
pre-established connection initiated by the phone to the server (security). This limitation exists when 
the node is behind a network address translation router (e.g., AT&T’s data plan) 
9However, we note current low-latency anonymous networks, such as Tor and I2P [17, 20, 29], cannot 
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Figure 19. Remote Sybil detection 
Our Approach. In the simplest form of the Stochastic PCD, ordinary user Eve is 
presented with two hypotheses, which she must test in the presence of separate third-
party communication with Alice and Bob’s nodes, and network jitter and delay. 
For private communication detection,  
H0: Alice and Bob do no communicate with each other 
H1: Alice and Bob communicate with each other 
 
For remote Sybil detection,  
H2: Alice and Bob are not physically the same node (non-Sybil) 
H3: Alice and Bob are physically the same node (Sybil) 
 
During a period of probing, Eve sends packets to Alice and Bob’s nodes and receives 
a (time) series of response times. Given the time series, she can use a classifier to 
detect which hypothesis (e.g., H0 or H1) is more likely to be true.  
The reason why classifying the time series of response times enables the detection of 










Alice’s, or respectively Bob’s, node (e.g., back-off in CSMA/CA) are different 
depending on the type of application running on that node.  For example, if Alice and 
Bob’s nodes communicate with each other via a WiFi network in a VoIP application, 
the WiFi radio channel contention caused by Eve’s probe messages would differ from 
that caused by Alice’s or Bob’s communication with third parties in web browsing or 
file transfer applications.  Hence, ordinary user Eve can construct two models of timing 
responses, obtained when two remote nodes communicate with each other via a VoIP 
application and when two remote nodes do not communication with each other via a 
VoIP application. Then Eve can apply supervised classification to the time series of 
responses obtained from Alice and Bob’s nodes in response to her probes, in order to 
detect their communication over VoIP, if any.  In short, Eve can exploit a timing side 
channel that is caused by the different types of resource-contention responses when end 
nodes run different applications. 
Eve can use Markov Chain models for classification and leverage its success in 
stochastic time series classification of automatic speech recognition [37, 44, 65]. She 
can also apply signal-processing techniques to filter out the noise from the time series 
of responses; i.e., we use a high-pass filter to eliminate the noise in certain frequency 
components. Finding good filters to fit the different time series of device responses is a 
routine design problem in signal processing, and thus any ordinary user can use 
standard tools (as illustrated later in this chapter) to analyze responses generated from 
the different devices and protocols. In performing such analysis for PCD, ordinary user 
Eve can merge the time series of different probe responses obtained from the targeted 




nodes can be established in a specific application, such as VoIP. 
Limitation. The proposed approach is most effective when the stochastic models 
chosen to represent the time series of probe responses can accurately model random-
access networks (e.g., Markov Chains can model CSMA/CA networks well), and 
when signal-processing techniques can eliminate much of the noise introduced by the 
third-party nodes. This is important because high-frequency target probing during the 
detection period may also cause adversary detection by the targets. Hence, the 
adversary must strike a delicate balance between detection accuracy and the 
possibility of attack detection.  
Sybil Attacks. There are a number of studies of Sybil detection in wireless, peer-to-
peer networks, and other areas. Levine et al. provide a comprehensive survey [46]. 
They conclude that Sybil attack defenses can be grouped into four categories: trusted 
certification, resource testing, recurring costs and fees and trusted devices. Our 
remote Sybil detection is a variation of resource testing, which implicitly asks the 
nodes to access certain shared resources (e.g., radio channels) to show they are not 
Sybil nodes [55]. Unlike other resource testing methods, however, our method does 
not require the target or its neighbor to perform specific resource testing actions (i.e., 
that a node send packets to the radio channel at a designated time). In other words, 
our Stochastic PCD approach can utilize the original networking environments 





3.2. Practical PCD Applications 
We will examine two applications for the Stochastic PCD as summarized in Table 7. 
The first application is WiFi where nodes compete for the radio channel. The second 
application is Instant Messaging, where the user switches between different chat 
windows, making the keyboard the resource under contention. The time series of 
probe responses for WiFi application has strong noise while time series data for 
Instant Messaging has negligible noise. For each of these two applications, we 
describe the application, experiment environments, and procedure of experiments. 
Table 7. Two PCD applications 
 WiFi Instant 
Messaging 
Resource under contention Radio channel Keyboard  
Noise due to non-targeted nodes Yes No
*
  
Noise due to internet and application-layer proxy Yes Negligible
#
 
*:For this experimental setting 
#: Human actions in Instant Messaging are measured in seconds, while network delay and jitters rarely exceed 1 second 
3.2.1. WiFi 
WiFi provides multiple access to radio channels through IEEE 802.11 protocol suite 
as shown in Figure 20. In a radio channel of the selected frequency, nodes compete 
for channel usage according to CSMA/CA protocol. When a node wants to send a 
frame, if another node is using the channel or is expected to use the channel (virtual 
carrier sensing), this node will be back off and try to re-access the channel after a 
random period; otherwise, the node sends it immediately. In this way, a node’s traffic 
affects other nodes in the same WiFi network.  




remotely to a targeted node in a WiFi network, the response time will be influenced 
by the traffic of the WiFi network. If two targeted nodes Alice and Bob in the same 
WiFi network are communicating with each other under constant-rate traffic (e.g., 
Voice), the impact on the transmission time is retained during this probing period. 
Suppose the traffic of other nodes (not Alice nor Bob) in the WiFi network are web 
browsing video streaming, or SSH, but not VoIP, the remote ordinary user Eve can 
distinguish whether VoIP is in session by the time series of the probe responses. 
 
Figure 20. Radio channel is the shared resource in WiFi 
3.2.1.1. Experimental Environment 
Two nodes Alice and Bob are in the same WiFi network provided by a WiFi Access 
Point, which is connected to the Internet. Since PCD depends on the stochastic time 
signals, not the protocols, we would like to know PCD’s performance in different 
network environments. The experiments are performed in two different locations. The 
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university café is in the lobby of a large computer science building where hundreds of 
WiFi users can access the internet through over about 10 WiFi access points. Hence, 
the university café is a wireless environment with high dynamics. In the author's 
apartment, WiFi user dynamics are limited to only one to two WiFi users, in 
additional to the Alice and Bob.  
The configuration for the private communication detection is shown in Figure 21. 
Nodes Alice and Bob are two laptops, a MacBook Air (Mac OS X version Lion) and 
a MacBook Pro (Mac OS X version Snow Leopard), respectively. Both have the 
VoIP client CounterPath X-Lite installed. Eve has the VoIP IDs of node Alice and 
node Bob, and therefore is able to send probe VoIP packets to the targets through a 
VoIP proxy and get responses. The VoIP proxy is an OpenSips server running on a 
Linux server located in a university computer cluster room [56].  
The configuration for the remote Sybil detection is shown in Figure 22. The target is a 
HP laptop which is running Windows 7 and has an Intel WiFi NIC. This Intel NIC 
supports “My WiFi”, a wireless NIC virtualization technology that enables the 
wireless NIC to serve as different roles in the same time [12, 77]. When “My WiFi” is 
enabled, an Apple iPhone 4 can access the Internet through the laptop. In this case, 
the laptop has two virtual identities, fulfilling hypothesis H3 for remote Sybil 
detection. One identity connects to the WiFi Access Point and gains Internet access 
while the other identity acts as a WiFi Access Point, providing WiFi service to 
iPhone. The laptop is also equipped with VoIP client X-Lite so that Eve can probe the 





Figure 21. Experimental environment for WiFi private communication detection 
 
Figure 22. Experimental environment for WiFi remote Sybil detection 
3.2.1.2. Procedure 
In both of the settings, Alice or Bob will browse the web and use SSH to connect to 
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detection, we condition upon whether Alice and Bob share a VoIP communication 
(H0 and H1). Eve uses the program Voice Pulser (as seen in Chapter 2) to probe both 
Alice and Bob. The program will send SIP OPTIONS requests, VoIP probe packets in 
the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), to targeted nodes with a 100ms interval (~10 
Hz) [31]. For each condition, the program probes the targeted nodes 120000 times. In 
Section 3.4.2. , we will split the results in each condition to 12 samples.  
For the remote Sybil detection, we condition upon whether the laptop enables “My 
WiFi” and shares the Internet with the iPhone (H2 and H3). However, Eve only probes 
the laptop, not iPhone, due to the fact that the IP address obtained by the iPhone is 
private and not routable (e.g., 192.168.0.0/16). For each condition, the program 
probes the targeted nodes for 120000 times as well.  
3.2.2. Instant Messaging 
The Instant Messaging (IM) service is an interactive social medium that enables 
person-to-person real-time text chatting. Common systems include Facebook, AOL 






Figure 23. Keyboard is the shared resource in Instant Messaging  
On the user interface, IM has one contact status window that shows a list of contacts. 
The IM user can select a contact and begin a one-to-one text chat with the contact via 
another window. Due to human limitations and the design of the user interface, the 
IM user can only type in only one window at one time (i.e. only one window gains 
the keyboard input focus). Therefore, keyboard, or the corresponding end-user 
attention, is the resource under contention. Chatting with one contact affects chatting 
with a different contact because the end user needs to switch between chat windows.  
Hence, the shared keyboard causes side channels as illustrated in Figure 23. When 
Eve chats with a targeted user, the timing of the interactions will be affected by the 
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the regular text messages, all major IM systems support composing notification 
messages10, which are sent periodically when the IM user is typing on the keyboard, 
but has not yet sent the message. Therefore, Eve can use the received regular text 
messages and composing notification messages to obtain the private information of 
interest.  
3.2.2.1. Experimental Environment 
Human participants use IM client software named pidgin to chat with their contact 
[63]. The communications are relayed through an IM server. The pidgin is modified 
to log received regular text messages and composing notification messages. The 
investigator (Eve in this case), who also participates in chatting, records the timing of 
received regular text messages and composing notification messages. In addition, 
although IM allows conference chatting, we only focus on one-on-one text chatting 
with one or more contacts. 
It is usually a challenge to recruit human subjects for research, and our experiment is 
no exception. We use the following approaches to ease the recruitment and make 
maximum use of the data: 
1. Virtualization. The participants do not need to come to the designated site. 
Instead, they use their own computers to connect to the virtual machine where 
pidgin is installed and investigators’ instructions will be displayed. The 
                                                 
10  There are different names for composing notification messages. We use the name composing 





investigator’s computer hosts these virtual machines so that the investigator can 
monitor whether the participants follow the instructions. 
2. Cross-validation: Cross-validation is used to exhaustively utilize the limited 
number of experiment samples [73]. Given all the samples, a certain number of 
samples are picked as the training set and the rest are used as the testing set. By 
iterating combinations of the training vs. sample set, the result utilizes all samples 
for both training and testing.  
3.2.2.2. Procedure 
For private communication detection, we have 5 groups of participants (2 
participants/group) who perform 4 sessions of a 5-minutes experiment. In two of the 
sessions, two participants both chat with the investigator (H0). In another two 
sessions, two participants both chat with the investigator as well as chat to each other 
(H1). Each session generates a sample of 5-minutes time series and totally 10 samples 
are available for each hypothesis. 
For remote Sybil detection, we can also use the data for private communication 
detection. In private communication detection, we have 20 existing samples that 
correspond to H2 (non-Sybil) data in remote Sybil detection. Therefore, we need only 
to perform experiments where H3 (Sybil) is hold. To this end, 5 groups of participants 
(1 participant/group) perform 4 sessions of experiments where each participant uses 
two IM accounts to concurrently chat with the investigator. Therefore, we have the 
samples for H3 in remote Sybil detection.  Combining these 20 samples with the 20 




we have 20 samples available for both hypotheses for remote Sybil detection.   
Before a group of participants begins the experiments, they remotely login to the 
virtual machine and the investigator gives instructions for how to use the 
environment. Besides pidgin, there is a program on the virtual machine that displays 
the investigator’s instructions. The investigator gives instructions to the participants 
for when to chat and whom to chat with.  
During the experiments, the pidgin program logs the timing of regular text messages 
and composing notification messages. The event times are then converted to a time 
series with the resolution in seconds. Data points in the converted time series indicate 
whether or not the participant has been busy typing to the investigator at each second. 
The converting algorithm is described as follows.  
The estimated busy period is when the contact is busy typing to the investigator. This 
begins when a composing notification is received, and ends when a regular text 
message is received. However, the period could be over-estimated in the following 
scenario. An IM user types something to a contact but does not hit send, but instead 
switches to chat with another contact. Eventually the user switches back to send the 
unsent message to the first contact. A simple and effective way is to set an upper 
bound of the estimated period, say 15 seconds. We assume that 15 seconds is a 
reasonable period for someone to type and send one message. If the estimated period 
is larger than 15 seconds, we assume that the estimated busy period is 15 seconds 





3.3. The Attack 
We show the architecture of PCD followed by its components and the design choices 




X[n]: The input time series or a certain data point of the input time series indexed by n.  
P[n] and Q[n]: If the input time series is 2-dimensional, then P[n] and Q[n] represent the time series 
of the first and the second dimension, respectively.   
 
Figure 24. Stochastic PCD  
PCD inputs a time series of response times and outputs which hypothesis is more 
likely to be true. The input time series is either 1-dimesional or 2-dimensional, is 
discrete in time, and can be discrete or continuous in value. 
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inspired by Automatic Speech Recognition [37]. The input time series are processed 
through each applicable stage and the private information of interest is generated in 
the end. 
1. The first stage, merging, is only applied when the PCD input time series is 2-
dimensional. The merging stage will convert P[n] and Q[n] to a new time 
series, denoted as X[n] for convenience. This stage reduces dimensionality for 
ease of classification but retains the information contained in both P[n] and 
Q[n].  
2. The next stage, filtering, eliminates the noise contained in series X[n]. If X[n] 
is noisy and this stage is skipped, it is likely Eve cannot gain an information 
advantage (i.e., accuracy is not much higher than 50%). The filtering stage 
inputs a time series and outputs another time series. Through filtering, the 
frequency components where noise resides will be eliminated.  
3. The third stage is quantization, which reduces the number of possible values 
of the time series (i.e., size of the sample space). When there are more 
possible values, a larger the number of parameters will be needed in the next 
stage.  
4. The fourth stage, stochastic modeling, which has two stochastic models for 
the two hypotheses. A stochastic model represents a variable-length time 
series through a fixed and small set of parameters. Through stochastic models, 
two operations are available: 1) to estimate the parameters of the stochastic 




given the model.  
5. The final stage, detection, is to make the detection decision based on the 
probability of a time series given the pre-trained models trained.   
Assumptions and limitations. PCD assumes that the private information of interest 
(i.e., whether two targets are communicating; whether nodes Sybil nodes) does not 
change during the period that PCD probing is performed. This assumption indicates 
that the time resolution of PCD may be limited and application-dependent. 
Furthermore, high-frequency target probing may also cause the detection of the attack 
by the targets. In contrast, in passive probing, such as Instant Messaging, adversary 
detection is irrelevant since PCD is only applicable when there is an active 
conversation between the adversary and the targets.  
Stochastic PCD can be applied effectively in network protocols where stochastic 
models capture the time series of probe responses accurately, and when signal 
processing can eliminate most of the noise introduced by active third-party nodes. 
The former suggests that stochastic PCD is well suited in random access networks 
(e.g., CSMA/CA), since Markov Chains can model them properly. In contrast, 
stochastic PCD is not easily applicable to non-random-access networks such as 
TDMA. The latter suggests that if the traffic between the target and the third-party 
nodes (e.g., web browsing, video streaming, and SSH) is different from the traffic 
between the targets (e.g., VoIP communication), the filtering component of PCD can 
effectively remove the noise brought by the third-party nodes. However, if the traffic 




targets, PCD may experience false detection. Despite this, by repeatedly performing 
PCD, the adversary can still determine the long-term relationship between the targets 
[25]. Detection confidence increases as the number of communication instances 
increase. 
Optional stages. Some of the stages are optional or unnecessary in certain situations. 
If the input is 1-dimensional, the merging stage is skipped. If the input time series is 
not noisy, the filtering stage can be skipped. If the input time series are discrete-
valued and the number of distinct values is small enough, the third stage 
(quantization) can be skipped. If Eve is training models, the last stage is skipped.  
3.3.2. Components 
We will describe the choices of each component of PCD. Although our choices are 
not optimal due to the large design space, our choices do show the achievability of 
PCD with reasonable accuracy as seen later in the evaluation section. Finding better 
component implementations, such as trying other filters or stochastic models, would 
be among the important future work.  
3.3.2.1. Merging Stage 
We have two choices, Cartesian and Hadamard products, to implement the merging 
stage. The former is suitable for discrete input time series (e.g., IM application) while 
the latter is suitable for continuous input time series (e.g., WiFi application).  
Cartesian Product. If P[n] and Q[n] are discrete in values, the Cartesian product is the 




sample space (possible values) {0,1}, then the output time series will a sample space 
{{0,0}, {0,1}, {1,0}, {1,1}} which contains four difference values. The formula of 
the Cartesian product merging can be written as  
X[n]={P[n], Q[n]} for every n.  
The size of the new state space is the square of the size of the original state space. 
However, the Cartesian product has the potential problem of state space explosion, 
i.e. when the new state space becomes so large that the amount of training data for the 
stochastic models becomes unwieldy. Therefore, if the input time series is continuous 
in value, the Cartesian product is inappropriate and the following Hadamard product 
should be used.   
Hadamard Product. The Hadamard product merge two (continuous-valued or 
discrete-valued) time series into one, while retaining the information of P[n] and 
Q[n].  
X[n]=P[n]Q[n]  for every n  
The idea comes from the fact that the Hadamard product is a way to measure the 
similarity between two vectors. For example, the Fourier transform is a function of 
frequency that converts a time series to the magnitude of a given frequency. The 
value of a Fourier transform at frequency f is the sum of Hadamard product of the 
time series and a sine/cosine function. Similarly, then the new X[n] will go up or 
down when both P[n] and Q[n] go up or down and hence X[n] keeps the information 





3.3.2.2. Filtering Stage 
The filtering stage uses digital filters to improve the quality of the input time series 
data to get a better final PCD accuracy. A digital linear filter of input X[n] is a 
mechanism to process a time series by calculating the difference equation as shown 
below. The parameters ai and bi decide the behavior of a causal filter and N is the 
order of the filter. 
 
High-Pass Filtering. A high-pass filter is a filter that attenuates the low frequency 
components of a signal. The frequency components with frequency lower than a 
given cut-off frequency will have lowered magnitude. Similarly, a low-pass filter 
attenuates the high frequency components of a signal. Modern filter design use a 
prototype filter (e.g., the Butterworth filter) and convert it to be low-pass, high-pass, 
or an even band-pass filter with different cut-off frequencies. When applying high-
pass or low-pass filters on the filtering stage, Eve should choose the type of filter (e.g. 
Butterworth, Elliptic filters), the order (the value of N), and the cut-off frequency 
such that the final PCD accuracy is maximized. Our empirical experience on the WiFi 
application shows that the type and the order of the filter do not have much impact, 
but the cut-off frequency dominates the performance. 
Log. log() can be applied before or after the filtering such that Eve can emphasis the 















function. Other increasing and concave functions, such as the square root, should 
have a similar effect. Note that if the log transformation is applied before filtering, the 
Hadamard product of merging stage becomes an addition. 
3.3.2.3. Quantization Stage 
If the input time series is continuous or is discrete but the set of possible values 
(sample space) is large, its value should be converted to a smaller discrete set for 
efficient stochastic modeling. Stochastic models have parameters which need to be 
trained before use. In general, a stochastic model with more parameters needs to be 
trained with a larger set of training data.  
We use the simplest quantization scheme which divides the interval between the 
maximum value and the minimum value into equal size. However, if log() is applied 
in the previous stage, the equal-quantization can be regarded as log-scale 
quantization.  
3.3.2.4. Stochastic Modeling Stage 
Our choice of stochastic model is 1
st
 order discrete-time Markov Chains due to the 
fact that it is simple, easy to analyze, and the number of parameters is relatively 
small. The more parameters included, the more data that is required to train the 






order Markov Chains first and then use more complex stochastic models 11  if 
necessary.  
Markov Chain. A discrete-time Markov Chain is a sequence of random variables 
Y1,Y2,... with the Markov property, that is the state transition from Yn to Yn+1 will not 
be affected by any of the previous states Yn-1,...,Y1. Or we can write as 
Pr{Yn+1|Yn}=Pr{Yn+1|Yn,Yn-1,...,Y1}. We can think of Markov Chains as capturing the 
relationship between a data point and the next data point in a time series. As a 
Markov Chain characterizes all pairs of adjacent data points, it characterizes a time 
series. The parameters of a Markov Chain are the transition probabilities from one 
state to another state. Therefore, for a state space of size k, a Markov Chain has k
 2
 
parameters, namely a transition matrix.   
3.3.2.5. Detection  Stage 
Maximum likelihood. The previous stage gives the conditional probability of a time 
series, given the stochastic models. In this stage, the conditional probabilities will be 
used to make the final detection result. One of the most popular methods is maximum 
likelihood (ML), where the detection result belongs to the hypothesis that has larger 
conditional probability. For the private communication detection, suppose M0 and M1 
are models corresponding to H0 and H1, the result is 
Hi, where i=1{Pr{Y|M0}<Pr{Y|M1}}  
                                                 
11 For example, semi-Markov models and N-order Markov chains are more general and have more 





For the remote Sybil detection, suppose M2 and M3 are two models corresponding to 
H2 and H3, the result is  
Hi, where i=1{Pr{Y|M2}<Pr{Y|M3}}+2  
3.4. The Attack Experiments 
First we will show what the time series in both applications looks like. For WiFi 
application where the signal is noisy, we also show why we would need filtering due 
to the signal characteristics. We then show the accuracy of both applications as the 
performance index. The accuracy is defined as the number of correct detections 
divided by the total number of detections. Since we have half samples in H0 and 
another half samples in H1, a blind guess (50% accuracy) becomes the baseline 
comparison rate. If the accuracy is much higher than 50%, we can say Eve gains 
information advantages through PCD. 
Table 8. PCD settings in two applications 
 WiFi Instant Messaging 








2. Filtering stage Butterworth high-pass filter 
with order 10; log() used 
N/A 
3. Quantization stage Equally quantized by 12 N/A 
4. Stochastic modeling stage 1st order discrete time 
Markov Chain 
1st order discrete time 
Markov Chain 
5. Decision stage Maximum Likelihood Maximum Likelihood 
 
The performance of both applications is evaluated under the settings as shown in 




targeted node is busy typing to Eve), we can use the Cartesian product in merging, 
and skip the filtering and quantization stages.  
3.4.1. Signal characteristics 
Two samples of time series for WiFi application for private communication detection 
are shown in Figure 25. We have two samples of 10000 data points (~1000 seconds) 
under the hypotheses H0 and H1. We can see that values are mostly close to 0ms and 
around 500ms. The 500ms values are due to the packet lost. Because Eve sends VoIP 
packets through a VoIP proxy, the proxy will retransmit if the responses are not 
received in 500ms as defined by Timer E in RFC 3261[31]. In this figure, it is not 
easy to visually find the difference of these two signals, except the two spikes in H0.  
 
Figure 25. Two examples (H0 and H1) of WiFi time series for private communication detection  
  















































Frequency analysis helps to analyze time series in another aspect. A signal can be 
presented in the time domain as a time series, as well as in the frequency domain. A 
signal in the time domain is a function of time to show the magnitude at different 
time. On the other hand, a signal in the frequency domain is a function of frequency 
to show the magnitude at different frequencies. The Fourier transform can translate a 
signal from the time to frequency domain. Therefore, by applying the Fourier 
transform, we can examine a signal in the frequency domain, allowing us to explore 
the properties that are not easily observed in the time domain. However, the original 
Fourier transform has the limitation of being a global analysis. For example, if a sine 
wave appears only in the beginning of the time series, when in the frequency domain, 
we do not know whether this wave appears in the beginning or in the end of the time 
series. Such limitation bring us the problem that we will not know if a pattern shown 
in the frequency domain appears in the whole time series, or just in part of it.  
 
Figure 26. Frequency-time analysis of the H0 signal in Figure 25 shows strong frequency 
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To overcome the drawback of frequency analysis, time-frequency analysis can be 
used to look at the time and frequency simultaneously. For example, Short Time 
Fourier Transform (STFT) does Fourier transform on a portion of the signal, repeated 
many times so that the whole signal is covered. Figure 26 shows the frequency-time 
analysis of the signals in Figure 25. It is particularly noticeable that the low frequency 
components remains high at all time. It is easy to say that the low-frequency 
components are either very important or not wanted at all (noise). From this 
observation, we tested high-pass and low-pass filters with different cut-off frequency 
and found that that removing the low-frequency components via high-pass filters 
helps to improve the performance of the Stochastic PCD in WiFi significantly. 
But why are the high-frequency components important and why are the low-
frequency components noisy? In Figure 27, we zoom in and see the first 500 data 
points of the Figure 25 signals. Except for the spikes caused by packet lost, the 
response time is about 50ms with small fluctuations. The fluctuation is network jitter 
caused by Internet switching and the WiFi back-off. Since the side channel we are 
interested in is the WiFi back-off behavior, the fluctuation of the signals may contain 
the useful information we are looking for. Since log(x) is a strictly increasing and 
concave function when x>1, it can emphasis the signals in small values, where the 
fluctuations are. We applied log() before and  after high-pass filtering (twice), finding 





Figure 27. Detail version of Figure 25 
 
Figure 28. Two examples (H0 and H1) of IM time series for private communication detection 
We now look at the signals of IM in Figure 28. These are two samples of H0 (no 
communication between Alice and Bob) and H1 (communication between Alice and 
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Bob) in the form of the busy status of Alice and Bob according to the estimated busy 
period. In the experiments we have samples of 300 seconds, but here we only show 
the first 200 seconds. Using the Cartesian product to merge the busy status of both 
targeted nodes, the time series will have four states. These refer to both nodes being 
busy, only Alice as busy, only Bob as busy and both nodes not busy, as perceived by 
Eve. Unlike the signals in WiFi which are quite noisy, the signals here seem simpler 
and there seem to be some patterns.  
Through these patterns in the IM time series, we created the first version of PCD 
which contains only the last two stages. This idea works and then we apply it to WiFi 
but encounter difficulties because the WiFi signals are very noisy, such that the 
accuracy is very close to the baseline (50%; blind guess) or even worse than the 
baseline. To deal with the noise, we brought the first three stages to PCD, finding that 
it improves the results considerably.  
3.4.2. WiFi 
The accuracy of PCD and remote Sybil detection in the WiFi application is shown in 
Figure 29 and Figure 30, respectively. The square mark shows the average accuracy 
using the samples obtained in the university café for training and testing. We use one 
sample (10000 data points) to train the system and use the other 11 samples for 
testing. We again use cross-validation so that any one sample used as the training 
sample will produce an accuracy measure. Thus, averaging of 12 accuracy measures 





Figure 29. Performance of private communication detection in WiFi (high-pass Butterworth 
filter with normalized cut-off normalized frequency f=0.3, No log() applied) 
 
Figure 30. Performance of remote communication Sybil in WiFi (high-pass Butterworth filter 
with normalized cut-off normalized frequency f=0.3, log() applied before and after high-pass 
filtering) 

































































The diamond marks show the average accuracy when we use the samples obtained in 
the apartment setting for training and testing. In both of the figures the average 
accuracy also rises significantly after applying filtering. In addition, we can see that 
the performance for the apartment samples is better than the performance for the 
university café samples. The reason is obvious: the university café environment is 
noisier (with more WiFi users) than the apartment. 
We then consider the case where the system is trained by one sample but is tested on 
all other samples from both university café and the apartment. This is a way to 
evaluate the impact of environment variation to the detection. The results are showed 
by the circle marks in both of the figures. It is not surprising that the performance is 
lower because the trained models do not fit the testing samples closely. We will 
discuss about the environment variation in Section 3.5.  
We have the following findings: 
1. High-frequency components are useful. When high-pass filters are applied, 
the accuracy improves significantly. The reason is that the transmission jitter 
due to WiFi back-off is subtle in the time scale.   
2. Small values in signals are more important. It is human nature to notice the 
spikes (large values) in a time series. However, in this application, small 
values are more important, as we observed that applying Log() helps to 






In other words, PCD is successful in this WiFi application because it extracts the 
useful information from the small time scale (high frequency) and small values from 
time series. It is different from most signals where high frequency components and 
visually-recognizable patterns have the most useful information. 
3.4.3. Instant Messaging 
The number of samples in the IM condition is extremely limited. Therefore we use a 
version of cross-validation in which k (k<10 for private communication detection and 
k<20 for remote Sybil detection) samples are randomly selected to train models and 
the rest are used to evaluate accuracy. The average accuracy conditioned in the 
number of training samples is the performance of interest.  
 
Figure 31. Performance of private communication detection in IM (total 10 samples per 
hypothesis) 





























Figure 32. Performance of remote Sybil detection in IM (total 20 samples per hypothesis)  
Both goals show that average accuracy is above 50% which is the baseline when a 
blind guess is applied instead of PCD. In addition, both goals also suggest that more 
samples would give higher average accuracy. For private communication detection, 
as shown in Figure 31, the average accuracy grows from 65.0% to 70.0% as the 
number of training samples increases from 1 to 9. Similarly, for remote Sybil 
detection, as shown in Figure 32, the average accuracy grows from 67.4% to 92.5% 
as number of training samples increases from 1 to 19.  
Therefore we have the following findings for the Instant Messaging application. 1) 
PCD is achievable in IM since the average accuracy is much better than the baseline. 
2) There is a trend for IM application to gain higher performance when more samples 
are available. 




























3.5. Environmental Variation 
The WiFi application shows environment variation reduces the accuracy. In WiFi, 
both goals have lower accuracy when we use all samples from the university café and 
apartment for training and testing.  
Does it mean that PCD can only work if Eve can obtain many training samples from 
the place where the targeted nodes reside? From the experiences of speech 
recognition, from which our architecture is inspired, it may not be true. Speech 
recognition initially supports only speaker-dependent recognition, meaning that the 
training and testing samples should come from the same source. However, later 
speaker-independent recognition is achieved by adjusting the variance, such as using 
a linear transform of existing models from many speakers [23, 37, 44]. Therefore, for 
PCD, once we have enough data from different network environments, similar things 
can be done to adapt the trained models to the variation of network environment. In 
other words, training may be achieved from small samples over a variety of 
situations, rather than just the specific targeted network environment. Also, Eve may 
use a probe time series to find the optimal way of adjusting trained models.  
3.6. Summary 
This solution to the PCD problem is a stochastic analysis that extracts non-traditional 
side-channel information caused by resource contention. As network jitters and 
delays make the side channels very noisy, our approach treats the noise with signal 




signal processing techniques in this side-channel attack suggests that other signal 
processing techniques, such as Wiener filters and Wavelet Packet Decomposition, 





Chapter 4: Service-Priority PCD 
We propose the Service-Priority PCD approach that performs a PCD attack against 
mobile communication systems, particularly the 3G and 2G systems. Similar to the 
Resource-Saturation PCD approach, this approach was developed by analyzing the 
mobile communication protocols. The main challenge is the complexity of these 
mobile communication protocols. The chapter also illustrates the vulnerability of 2G 
phones to denial of service attacks whose perpetrators cannot be easily identified.  
4.1. Overview 
Our Approach. We start with a simple example where only two phones are targeted. 
(Generalizing this example to multiple phones poses no significant obstacle to an 
ordinary user attempting to collect call records.) Suppose that ordinary user Eve, 
illustrated in Figure 33, aims to collect the call records generated by two smartphones, 
which belong to users Alice and Bob. First, adversary Eve is able to surreptitiously 
probe the target phones used by Alice and Bob to discover whether they are busy; i.e., 
she can send data packets to the target phones over the Internet, which would remain 
undetected by Alice and Bob. (Various probing techniques that satisfy this 
requirement are discussed in Section 3.)  Eve can then analyze the timing of received 
responses. Eve can correlate the busy-status of Alice and Bob’s phones and 





Figure 33. Adversary goal and capabilities 
The key enabler for surreptitious busy-status monitoring by remote probes is the 
radio resource management policy of the 2/3G mobile communication system, which 
gives priority to voice over data services. If an adversary repeatedly probes the target 
phone via the data service, the response time spikes when the phone is busy, due to 
the lower priority given to the data service. This is a classic side channel for detecting 
the busy status of a smartphone: an adversary is able to determine whether a phone is 
busy by simple timing analysis of responses to probe messages [40]. Whenever two 
phones become busy during the same probing period, it is likely that the users of 
these two phones are having a conversation during that period.  
False Detection. The false detection of calls between two targeted smartphones has 
only two possible sources in our given adversary setting. First, when two target 
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to an adversary’s probes become indistinguishable from those obtained when the 
phones talk to each other. A second possible source of false detection occurs if at 
least one of the target smartphones is accessing the Internet (e.g., Internet radio 
streaming or web surfing) during the probing period. Then, at least theoretically, it 
might be possible that its probing response could be confused with the response 
received when the voice service is in use. 
The false detection rate for the first case depends on the probing interval, namely the 
shorter the interval the lower the false detection rate. For example, if Alice and Bob 
both have a single call during a one-hour period and the probing interval is 10 
seconds, the false detection rate is 1.8% when the start time and the end time of the 
calls are uniform distributed random variables (viz., the Appendix I for details). The 
false-detection rate drops to 0.24% when the probing interval is 1 second. For all 
practical purposes these false-detection rates are insignificant for call-record 
collection. This is the case not only because these rates are extremely small but also 
because most call-record analyses require multiple instances of detected calls; e.g., 
strength-of-tie analysis requires call frequency and reciprocal initiation, and timing 
patterns. The more instances of detected calls in an analysis the greater the statistical 
confidence in the results obtained. 
The false detection rate for the second case above is zero. Although it would seem 
possible,  in practice, the response pattern of a smartphone engaged in Internet use is 
always very different from that obtained when voice services are used. The 




experiment Scenario E) confirm this general observation. 
Missed Detection. Missed detection of real calls during the probing period for two 
targeted smartphones occurs only when the data service of at least one of the phones 
fails to work properly. Because the data and voice services share the same radio 
resources, , the use of the voice service can never be missed unless the faulty data 
service prevents probing; e.g., unsuccessful handover or poor radio signal. The rate of 
data service failure can be approximated by the typical call-drop rates since both 
voice and data services use the same radio facilities. Recent market research [13] 
suggests that these rates are fairly insignificant; i.e., the call drop rates range between 
1.4% and 4.6% for four major U.S. carriers during a 90-day study, which would 
suggest a low false negative response rate. 
4.2. Introduction to 3G Mobile Communication Systems 
This section briefly introduces the 3
rd
 generation mobile communication system (3G) 
with emphasis on topics related to the proposed attack. Readers who are already 
familiar with 3G communication systems can skip this section. 
There are several approved 3G air interfaces, namely the wireless protocol suite. 
Among these air interfaces, in this chapter we study UMTS (Universal Mobile 
Telecommunication System) and GERAN (GSM EDGE Radio Access Network). The 
former is widely deployed and the latter is based on 2G technology. GERAN usually 
co-exists with UMTS and is used as a backup because of better coverage. In the rest 





3G provides data and voice service through packet switching and circuit switching, 
respectively [16]. 3G is an evolving technology, meaning that it has an initial release, 
and provides new functionality or modification in later releases with consideration of 
backward compatibility. The telecommunication carrier can choose to upgrade their 
3G services to newer releases for more and faster services. The first release is named 
after the release year (Release 99, or simply R99), and the following releases are 
named by integers starting from 4. In the rest of this chapter, we will discuss R99 and 
R6 because the former is the first release and the latter provides the faster data service 
HSPA (High Speed Packet Access). UMTS Release 6 or later is quite commonly 
deployed, as of 2012. HSPA includes downlink data service HSDPA (High Speed 
Download Packet Access) and uplink data service HSUPA (High Speed Upload 
Packet Access). 
Architecture. As illustrated in Figure 34, 3G provides data and voice services through 
an architecture consisting of three major parts: the core network (CN), the radio 
access network (RAN), and the user equipment (UE). UE is a phone or computer with 
3G access. UE and RAN are connected through an air interface, such as UMTS and 
GERAN. RAN and CN are connected via wired networks. When a UE wants to 
communicate with another UE or an Internet node, the UE first connects wirelessly to 
the RAN and then becomes accessible to the CN. Then the CN will connect the UE 
with a destination node. Many UEs support both 3G and 2G, which allows the use of 





Figure 34. 3G Architecture 
User Equipment. In 2G and 3G, UE has three classes. Class A has highest ability to 
provide circuit and packet switching simultaneously. For example, in a 2011 TV 
commercial, AT&T advertised that on its network the iPhone can provide 
simultaneous data and voice services (i.e., surfing while talking) [1]. Class B is the 
most common phone that can provide both circuit and packet switching, but in 
contrast to the iPhone, provides only one at a time. Class C can only provide circuit 
switching or packet switching. For example, a laptop with 3G access is of this class. 
Core Network. The CN consists of a subsystem to support packet switching (PS-
domain) and a subsystem to support circuit switching (CS-domain). Both of them are 
connected to the RAN. The RAN needs to satisfy the bandwidth demand from both 
circuit switching and packet switching. Therefore, RAN needs to provide radio 
Packet Switching (PS-
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resource management to utilize the radio efficiently and provide quality of service 
(QoS), which is extremely important for the voice service. 
Radio Access Network. RAN has two types of elements, RNC (Radio Network 
Controller) and Node-B (the base station). One RNC connects to multiple Node-B’s. 
RNC and Node-B together perform operations for the MAC Layer (Layer 2) and 
Node-B solely performs the Physical Layer (Layer 1). Radio resource management is 
managed by RNC prior to release 5 and is co-managed by RNC and Node-B in later 
releases, to improve performance. Nevertheless, we can regard RAN as the 
component that performs the radio resource management. 
4.2.2. UMTS Radio Resource Management (3G) 
The mechanism of radio resource management is specified in the protocols, but the 
policy is open to change [9, 11, 14]. The number of users able to simultaneously 
access the radio channel is limited. UMTS uses a 5Mhz band for uplink and another 
5Mhz band for downlink. UMTS provides multiple users access to the radio channel 
via CDMA and TDMA. Each 5Mhz radio channel is divided into 10ms or 2ms time 
slots (TDMA) and multiple users can use different codes to access the radio channel 
(CDMA). Although CDMA allows multiple users to use different codes to 
simultaneously access the radio channel, the number of codes (and the corresponding 
number of users) is limited.   
UMTS defines several transport channels which transmit information. Transport 
channels are layered between MAC and PHY. There are different ways to classify 




direction: transport channels can transmit information only for uplink, only for 
downlink, or both uplink and downlink. Second, users employing the transport 
channel may use the same code (i.e., common channel), or different codes (i.e., 
dedicated channel). Common channels require a random access mechanism like 
slotted ALOHA to work, and therefore messages cannot be delivered as quickly as by 
dedicated channels.  
Transport channels related to the proposed attack are listed in Table 9. The Dedicated 
Transport Channel (DCH) is used to deliver voice service because it is a dedicated 
channel which has stable throughput and supports both uplink and downlink. The 
Forward Access Channel (FACH) is used to deliver information from the network to 
the UE (downlink) and the Random Access Channel (RACH) is used to deliver 
information from the UE to the network (uplink). Both FACH and RACH are 
common channels that use less radio resources and consume less power than DCH. 
FACH and RACH are used to deliver information when the data rate requirement is 
low. The Broadcast Channel (BCH) and Paging Channel (PCH) are used to broadcast 
information from the network to the UE and are less relevant to our attack.  
In Release 5, UMTS added High Speed Downlink Packet Access (HSDPA) to 
improve the downlink speed in packet switching. Specifically, a new transport 
channel named High-Speed Downlink Shared Channel (HS-DSCH) was introduced. 
In Release 6, UMTS added High Speed Uplink Packet Access (HSDPA) which 
improved the uplink speed in packet switching domain.  The corresponding new 




Table 9. UMTS transport channels related to the proposed attack 
Transport 
Channel 
Direction Dedicated or 
Common 
Use 
DCH  Uplink/Downlink Dedicated Voice or mid-rate data 
RACH Uplink Common Low-rate data 
FACH Downlink Common Low-rate data 
BCH/PCH Downlink Common Sleeping mode 
HS-DSCH (R5) Downlink Common High-rate data 
E-DCH (R6) Uplink Dedicated High-rate data 
 
 
Figure 35. RRC state machine 
UMTS uses the protocol Radio Resource Control (RRC) to establish, maintain and 
terminate the radio connection between UE and RAN. Each pair of UE and RAN 
maintains a state machine as shown in Figure 35. The state in which that the RRC 
machine is indicates which transport channels are used for transporting packets.  
When a UE powers on, the initial state is RRC Idle Mode, which means no RRC 
connection is established. If a RRC connection is established, the state machine enters 
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the RRC Connected Mode, which consists of four sub-states. If there is a voice call or 
the demand for data service is high, the state machine will enter the CELL_DCH state. 
In this state, transport channels supporting high speed transmission, such as DCH or 
HS-DSCH, are used. If the demand for data service is low, the state machine will 
enter the CELL_FACH state. In CELL_FACH, common transport channels such as 
FACH and RACH are used because they use less radio resources and save power.  
When there is no data or voice service demand, the state machine may enter the 
CELL_PCH or URA_PCH state. Both of these are called sleep mode, because the 
power consumption is low without active Internet access or voice calls. The 
difference between CELL_PCH and URA_PCH is the mobility. In CELL_PCH, the 
system maintains a more accurate location of the UE but these two states are not of 
interest in our experiment. 
4.2.3. GERAN Radio Resource Management (2G) 
GERAN consists of GSM and GPRS technologies. GSM is a 2G technology that 
provides data and voice services via circuit switching [67]. The data service in circuit 
switching is slow because circuit switching is not as efficient as packet switching. To 
increase the data rates and improve radio efficiency, GPRS was introduced as an 
extension to GSM. GPRS provides data service through packet switching, but only 
requires a modified BSC (Base Station Controller), which is the GSM version of 
RNC, and a new packet switching subsystem (PS-domain) [38, 48]. The minimal 
design change saves the prior investments on the GSM network. GSM uses TDMA 
and FDMA such during a particular time slot, multiple nodes can access the radio 




The radio resource is completely controlled by the Base Station Set (BSS), which is 
the equivalent or close-to-equivalent component of RAN in terms of 3G. Therefore, 
BSS knows exactly which slots are not used. GPRS can ask BSS to assign these 
unused slots to it and provide data service via packet switching. In this case, voice 
service (GSM) has absolute priority over data service (GPRS), because GPRS can 
only use the slots that GSM does not fill. On the other hand, GPRS may suffer from 
low service quality. Later, an enhanced version was proposed, to allow BSS to 
reserve some slots for GPRS. For example, each frequency in GSM has 8 time slots 
and one or two may be reserved for GPRS. This version provides starvation 
prevention for GPRS, but GPRS still has lower priority than GSM. 
If accessing GPRS and GSM simultaneously (i.e., surfing while talking) is desired, 
the UE either needs to be class A or to support Dual Transfer Mode (DTM) [59]. 
DTM is a feature starting from R99. When data service is ongoing and a voice call 
comes in, data service is disconnected and then voice service is established. Finally, 
the phone uses DTM to re-establish the data connection. A class A GSM/GPRS 
phone (not DTM) implies that two sets of hardware (e.g., transceivers) are needed and 
therefore the design is not favored by phone vendors for the additional cost. 
4.3. The Attack 
Since the proposed attack is based on remote probing for busy-status detection, we 
first will describe the possible ways for the adversary to probe the target phones. 
Then we will show how and why the probing response time reveals the busy status of 





Probing a smartphone is not as easy as probing an Internet server with ICMP, UDP or 
TCP. There are two concerns in the environment of mobile communications. First, 
mobility may make the phone IP address dynamic. It is impossible to probe a 
smartphone in the network or transport layer (IP/TCP/UDP) without knowing its IP 
address. Second, if the assigned IP address is private (i.e., certain IP addresses which 
are not routable), the traffic back and forth to the smartphone is processed by a 
Network Address Translation (NAT) device. NAT devices usually deny inbound 
IP/UDP/TCP packets if there is no previously associated connection established by 
the smartphone. For this reason, NAT devices actually act as a firewall to prevent 
IP/TCP/UDP probing. 
However, some apps running on smartphones make it possible to probe smartphones 
in the application layer. For example, VoIP and Instant Messaging apps need to run in 
the background and receive paging or messages. They may not listen to a port to 
accept a message from the outside, but they can establish a TCP/UDP session to a 
server that relays messages between smartphones and other VoIP/Instant Messaging 
users. For example, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is a widely-used protocol for 
VoIP and Instant Messaging [31]. A user Eve can send a SIP OPTIONS request 
message over TCP or UDP to the SIP server and the message will be forwarded to the 
destination user Alice. Alice will send back a corresponding SIP OPTIONS response 
message to Eve via the SIP server. Such probing can be launched by our Voice Pulser 




adversary can find a way to utilize the communication channel between the apps and 
the server.  
In addition to these methods, there are at least two other ways to probe the phones. 
When the adversary has a Private Branch Exchange (PBX) facility that can exchange 
telecommunication signals with the carrier of the target phone, the adversary could 
probe the target phone using signaling protocols (e.g., SIP).  Moreover, when the 
phone is continuously using streaming service, such as Internet radio, the adversary, 
acting as the streaming service provider, can use the streaming traffic to obtain the 
timing of messages. The latter method can be regarded as a passive means of probing, 
because although streaming is logically a one-way transmission from the streaming 
server to the phone, the phone still needs to provide feedback (i.e., ACK) to the 
streaming server for flow control. We use the similar passive probing in the Instant 
Messaging application of the Stochastic PCD approach. 
4.3.2. Busy-Status Detection 
The radio resource management in both 3G and 2G requires that the voice service has 
priority over the data service. In UMTS, a voice call will force the RRC state machine 
to enter the CELL_DCH state where dedicated transport channels will be used. In 
contrast, a data transmission may enter the CELL_DCH state only if the data rate is 
high enough, instead entering CELL_FACH for lower data rates. In the Dual Transfer 
Mode (DTM) mode with GSM/GPRS, when the data service is continuously provided 
and a voice call comes in, the data service is first disconnected and then attached to 




voice channel where the voice service only runs at half rate.  
These state differences matter because if the adversary can estimate the priority of the 
data service, she can detect if there is a call underway with the target phone. More 
specifically, when a UE is using data service, an incoming or outgoing voice call 
would likely lower the priority of this data service. The priority of the service is 
actually the state of the state machine inside the radio resource management (e.g., 
UMTS RRC state machine). Therefore, detecting whether a phone is busy is reduced 
to the problem of determining the state of state machine in the radio resource 
management.  
Identification of the radio resource management state (viz., Figure 35) by probing the 
target phone is possible because different channels are assigned in different radio 
resource management states [5]. In UMTS, if the RRC state machine moves from 
CELL_FACH to CELL_DCH state, the traffic transmission time is reduced because 
of the change of the corresponding transport channels. The transport channels used in 
CELL_FACH are common channels, i.e., multiple users share the same code to 
access the channel. Hence, transmission time is influenced by other UE under a 
random access method. On the other hand, voice service is carried by a DCH 
dedicated transport channel in the CELL_DCH state. With a dedicated transport 
channel, the UE is able to transmit without the delay brought by the random access 
method.  
This means that detection of the busy status of a phone can easily be done by probing 




phone is busy at that moment. After obtaining the time series of probe responses from 
the target phones, the adversary can infer the a call takes place between the targeted 
phones based on the following principle: If two phones become busy during the same 
period, they are detected as having a call with each other.  
As explained in the Introduction, the false detection rate depends on the time 
resolution of the busy-status detection, with coarser time-resolution leading to a 
higher false detection rate. (See Appendix I for the details of calculation.) For our 
experiments, we chose a probing rate that makes false detection of calls negligible.  
4.4. The Attack Experiments 
4.4.1. Experiment design 
We evaluate the proposed attack in a real-world environment as shown in Figure 36.  
Two phones are equipped with a VoIP app which can use 3G, 2G, or WiFi to connect 
to a public VoIP server. An attack program Voice Pulser running on a university 
server will send SIP OPTIONS probe messages to the two phones via the VoIP server. 
This setting, aside from the attack program, is essentially a real-world environment of 





Figure 36. Experiment environment 
The experiment equipment and environment are listed in Table 10. The attack target 
phones are an iPhone 4 and a Google Nexus One (android 2.1). These two phones are 
connected to the Internet by AT&T’s 3G network, 2G network or WiFi. The attack 
program sends VoIP requests (SIP OPTIONS) to the two phones and records the time 
of the responses. The VoIP client app is installed in both phones. Both of the phones 
have set up a VoIP account from the VoIP server. The VoIP app will periodically 
connect to the VoIP server for updating information and for keeping a communication 
channel open between the phone and the VoIP server. 




Google Nexus One  (hTC G1) 
android 2.1; 3G Rel. 6 (HSPA) 
Bob 
 
iPhone 4  
iOS 5.0; 3G Rel. 6 (HSPA) 
Mobile Network AT&T (UMTS/GPRS/GSM) 
3G Rel.  8 or later 
VoIP App Bria by Counterpath Corp. 
VoIP Server iptel.org, a public/free SIP service 
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In order to test different mobile network configurations, the experiments are 
performed in one of four locations, as shown in Table 11. Two locations are in a 
major city and the other two are in the suburban area of that city. These locations are 
miles or tens of miles away from each other to ensure that the phones will connect to 
different base stations.  
Table 11. Locations for experiments  
Location Type Description 
1  Urban A Carnegie Mellon University building in Pittsburgh 
2  Suburban A mall (Waterfront) outside Pittsburgh 
3 Suburban Monroeville, a satellite city of Pittsburgh 
4 Urban Highland park in Pittsburgh 
 
As shown in page 107, we design six scenarios to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
proposed attack. The specific question and steps of each scenario are listed below. 
Scenarios A to D test whether the proposed attack is effective in different 
environments. Scenario E tests whether the proposed attack is affected if the phones 
are using the Internet. Scenario F tests whether the adversary can detect whether the 
target phones are in the 3G network, instead of WiFi, such that the proposed attack is 
feasible. 
The following scenarios, except Scenario B, were performed in Location 1. In all 
scenarios, except Scenarios E and F, the experiment is done during a 5-minute session. 
The probing interval is 1 second, except in Scenario D and F. 
In Scenario A, we examine whether the attack is effective in 3G. Each session lasts 




different roles to the phones. A phone can be either the caller, or the callee. In closing 
the call, a phone can be either the one which hangs up the call, or which receives a 
hang-up signal.  
In Scenario B, we examine whether the attack is effective when the phones connect to 
different base stations. The reason is that the carrier may decide to use different 
parameters for radio resource management in different locations.  
In Scenario C and D, we examine whether the attack is effective in 2G. The two 
scenarios are different with respect to the probing interval. Scenario C has 1-second 
intervals whereas Scenario D has 8-second intervals. The reason for using the larger, 
8-second, interval is that higher rate probing causes denial of service in 2G phones 
(i.e., Scenario C) as described in Section 4.4.2.  
In Scenario E, we examine the false detection caused by the smartphone app’s 
Internet access. As a call might cause a response time spike, would Internet usage 
result in the same or a similar response patterns as with voice calls? To answer this 
question, we perform three 1-hour test sessions. In the first session, there is no 
Internet access for foreground apps, in order to set a baseline condition. In the second 
session, the iPhone calls the android phone every 5 minutes and terminates after 1 
minute. In the third session, both phones are listening to Internet radio streaming, 
which has a constant rate traffic of about 64Kbps. There are no calls or other 
foreground app activities during the third session. 
The last Scenario F, we test whether an adversary can distinguish if the target phones 




feasible nor of interest to our experiments. However, the Stochastic PCD can still be 
applied to WiFi as described in Chapter 3. 
Scenario A: Does the attack work in 3G? 
1. Turn on 3G and turn off WiFi 
2. Start to probe the both phone (1 second interval) 
3. At 120 seconds, one phone calls the other  (note that dialing needs time) 
4. After 60 seconds, one phone terminates the call 
5. Keep probing for 120 seconds 
6. The above steps are performed repeatedly using different roles for the phones (which 
phone makes the call; which phone terminates the call) 
 
Scenario B: Does the attack work in 3G in different locations (with different base stations)? 
1. Go to one of the four locations 
2. Turn on 3G in both phones and turn off WiFi 
3. Start to probe both phones (1 second intervals) 
4. At 120 seconds, one phone calls the other  (note that dialing needs time) 
5. After 60 seconds, one phone terminates the call 
6. Keep probing for 120 seconds 
 
Scenario C: Does the attack work in 2G? 
1. Turn off 3G and WiFi and use 2G 
2. Start to probe both phones (1 second intervals) 
3. At 120 seconds, one phone calls the other  (note that dialing needs time) 
4. After 60 seconds, one phone terminates the call 







Scenario D: Does the attack work in 2G with longer probing interval? 
1. Follow the same steps in scenario C except use an 8 second interval 
 
Scenario E: Is the attack affected when the phones are accessing the Internet? 
1. Turn on 3G and turn off WiFi 
2. Start to probe both phones (1 second interval) for 1hour  
3. Perform one of the following actions 
o No action 
o Every 5 minutes, Alice calls Bob and then Alice terminates after 1 minute 
o Two phones both listen to Internet radio 
 
Scenario F: Can the adversary distinguish if the phones are in 3G or in WiFi? 
1. Turn on 3G and turn off WiFi 
2. Start to probe both phones (20 second interval) for 2000 seconds (100 probes per phone) 
3. Turn off 3G and turn on WiFi 
4. Start to probe both phones (20 second interval) for 2000 seconds (100 probes per phone) 
4.4.2. Experiment Results 
The results of the experiments are summarized in Table 12. In brief, the attack is 
effective. The attack can be performed in 3G and 2G and it will not be affected when 
the phones are using the Internet. The adversary can distinguish whether the target 
phones are in 3G or WiFi.  
Table 12. Summary of experiment results 
Scenario Question Answer 
A  Does the attack work in 3G? Yes 
B Does the attack work in 3G in different locations (with different base 
stations)? 
Yes 
C Does the attack work in 2G (1 second probing interval)? No
*
 
D Does the attack work in 2G (8-second probing interval)? Yes 
E Is the attack affected when the phones are accessing the Internet? No.  
F Can the adversary distinguish if the phones are in 3G or in WiFi? Yes. 





The results of Scenario A are shown in Figures 31-34. The four figures show the 
probing results in the different assigned roles. All four figures suggest that there is a 
response time spike when there is a call between the two phones. The pattern is a 
triangle or trapezoid because of the priority change of the data service. When a call is 
established, the priority of the data service is lowered but the packets will still be 
delivered. This results in the response time increasing.  However, when a SIP VoIP 
message cannot get a response in 30 seconds, the VoIP server that relays the 
messages will respond with a “408 Request Timeout” [31]. Therefore, we would see a 
30 second cap in the response time. Finally, when the call is over, all queued probe 
messages are resumed. The response time shows a decreasing trend because these 
probe messages are sent at different times but received all at about the same time. 
It is likely, but we will need to perform further testing, that an adversary could also 
distinguish between the callee and the caller. In Figure 37 and Figure 38 where the 
iPhone is the caller, the response time spike happened a little earlier in the iPhone 
than in the android phone. In Figure 39 and Figure 40, where the android phone is the 
caller, the response-time spike of the iPhone and android are much closer. (Again, 
whether the caller role is distinguishable requires more experiment data to support 
this assertion.) 
In Figure 38, the android phone shows a small spike around time t=50 seconds. The 




The results of Scenarios B are shown in Figure 3712, Figure 41, Figure 42, and Figure 
43. These four figures show that the proposed attack is effective in the four locations 
where different base stations are used because the response time spike patterns of the 
iPhone and android do match. In Figure 41 and Figure 43 we can see there are small 
increases, stemming from the packets lost and retransmission. 
The testing performed for Scenario C actually failed. When the iPhone called the 
android phone, the android phone did not ring. When the android phone called the 
iPhone, the iPhone did not ring either. This is actually a denial of service attack. We 
believe it is a design or implementation flaw of 2G that could be readily exploited by 
an adversary. However, the next scenario shows that the proposed attack is still 
effective whenever the probing interval is large enough.  
The results of Scenario D are shown in Figure 44. The data points are less dense 
because of the long probing interval.  The response time spike of the android and 
iPhone here are matched with a time shift. With the iPhone as the caller and as the 
call terminating phone the response time spikes and then falls back earlier than the 
android phone. By considering the shift and using a long enough probing interval, the 
proposed attack is still effective in 2G. 
The results of Scenario E are shown in Figure 45. The upper subfigure shows the 
response time when the two phones have no calls nor Internet access by foreground 
apps. The middle subfigure shows the response time when the iPhone calls the 
                                                 
12 Since Scenario B in place 1 is the same with Scenario A when iPhone calls and iPhone terminates, 





android phone every 5 minutes. The lower subfigure shows the response time when 
the two phones are listening to the Internet radio streaming. For the first case, the 
response time is almost flat, except that the android phone has a 30-second response 
time between time t=1500 seconds and t=2000 seconds. (The reason is that the 
android lost Internet access during that period and the VoIP server responded “408 
Request Timeout” instead.) Note that this pattern is different from the pattern of the 
calls. Therefore, the adversary could easily distinguish the pattern of calls from the 
pattern of lack of Internet access. 
The results of the final Scenario F are shown in Figure 46. The upper subfigure shows 
the response time when the phones uses 3G and the lower subfigure shows the 
response time when the phone uses WiFi. The response time in both cases are quite 
visually different. The response time in 3G ranges between 0 to 1 seconds while the 
response time in WiFi rates below 0.4 seconds. The adversary may apply 
classification techniques, such as the Support Vector Machine (SVM) or Artificial 






Figure 37. iPhone calls android and iPhone terminates the call in location 1 (Scenarios A, B) 
 
Figure 38. iPhone calls android and android terminates the call in location 1 (Scenario A) 


























Phone responses to probing in location 1
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Figure 39. Android calls iPhone and android terminates the call in location 1 (Scenario A) 
 
Figure 40. Android calls iPhone and iPhone terminates the call in location 1 (Scenario A) 
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Figure 41. 3G attack in location 2 (Scenarios B) 
 
Figure 42. 3G attack in location 3 (Scenarios B) 
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Figure 43. 3G attack in location 4 (Scenarios B) 
 
Figure 44.  2G attack in location 1 (Scenario D) 
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Figure 45. Probing responses with no calls (upper figure), with calls every 5 minutes (middle 
figure), and with phones using Internet radio streaming (Scenario E) 
 
Figure 46. Probing responses in 3G and WiFi (Scenario F) 
































































































































































































































































This chapter describes a new and powerful privacy attack against smartphones by 
exploiting a fundamental design goal of mobile communication systems, namely to 
make radio resource management efficient by prioritizing traffic. This leads to a side 
channel, which an adversary can exploit to obtain private call record information. By 
probing the mobile phones via their data service interface, the adversary is able to 
distinguish whether the target phone is busy and to infer the occurrence of a call via 





Chapter 5: Countermeasures 
We will discuss general countermeasures against side-channel attacks and then the 
application-specific countermeasures for the four aforementioned PCD applications.  
5.1. Countermeasures against Side-Channel Attacks 
As summarized in Table 13, the three traditional ways to prevent side-channel attacks 
(which are not PCD-specific) are 1) blocking the side-channels, 2) adding noise to the 
side-channels, and 3) removing the source of side-channels. For the first one, since 
PCD is based on repeated probing, blocking such probing can block PCD. For 
example, a network end-node may use a firewall that blocks the suspicious periodic 
packets. Since probing can be performed in different layers (e.g., mobile phone 
probing can be done in the application layer or in the telecommunication signaling 
layer), the firewall should take care of packets in different layers. However, this 
countermeasure can only work when PCD is performed by active probing, namely 
sending probing packets explicitly, instead of analyzing existing communication such 
as the Instant Messaging application of the Stochastic PCD. Moreover, if blocking is 
done according to some packet signatures (e.g., SIP INVITE messages with an 
invalid IP address), attack packets which are encrypted or without known signatures 
will not be identified.  
This first method is more viable than the second and third countermeasures. For the 
second countermeasure, adding noise, we discovered that signal-processing 




countermeasure is not preferred unless the type and the magnitude of added noise is 
guaranteed to effectively prevent the Stochastic PCD. It would be desirable to see 
future work that would determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for adding 
noise effectively to side channels. The last countermeasure suggests that removing the 
resource contention can eliminate the side-channel information. However, removing 
resource contention may imply unlimited resource usage, which is not usually 
practical. 
Table 13. General countermeasures to PCD 
 Blocking side channels Adding noise to side 
channels 




Monitoring and blocking 
suspicious periodical 
network traffic 
Adding jitters to probing 
responses 
Removing the resource 
contention 
Achievability Yes (subject to 
application constraints; 
not for passive probing) 
Unknown (Signal-
processing techniques 
may eliminate added 
noise) 




Table 14. Application-specific PCD countermeasures 
 Blocking side 
channels 
Adding noise to 
side channels 
Removing the 










size or SIP 
transaction timer 





WiFi Applying the 
general 
countermeasure 
Adding jitters to 
probe responses 


















5.2. Application-Specific PCD Countermeasures 
As summarized in Table 14, we show the application-specific PCD countermeasures 
in the following subsections.  
5.2.1. Resource-Saturation PCD 
Randomization is a classic, if somewhat impractical, technique for defending against 
both covert- and side-channel attacks. In our case, phone firmware can be modified to 
provide randomization in the available size of protocol buffer or the transaction life. 
A limitation of this technique is that it may be incompatible with the manufacture’s 
firmware updates. A simpler countermeasure, though not a permanent solution, is for 
the VoIP administrator to use Voice Pulser to send “attack” packets at random 
intervals to the phones. This would introduce “noise” and reduce the adversary’s 
ability to estimate the number of available protocol buffer slots. To maintain the 
phones’ operability, the “attack” packets should be sent slowly enough that they 
would not fill the protocol buffer. This approach is scalable in the sense that one 
installation could protect many phones. One limitation of this approach is the 
availability of the server hosting Voice Pulser. If the server is unavailable, call 
privacy protection will also be unavailable.  
Another practical countermeasure is alerting the user when the protocol buffer is full 
or the SIP message rate is too high. This constitutes a simple way to remove the cover 
for otherwise undetectable busy-status probes. The SIP phone or the server could 




way to alert the user of a potential attack.  
5.2.2. Stochastic PCD 
We do not have a practical countermeasure that would work specifically for the 
Stochastic PCD. Adding noise to the side channels is one possible remedy for this 
attack, but it requires that we consider where to perform this and what noise to add. In 
the WiFi application, if noise is added in the WiFi network, we need to modify the 
MAC protocol, which is very undesirable. Noise added in the application proxy is a 
possible solution, but the WiFi user would likely need to convince the application 
proxy’s administrator or designers.  
Removing resource contention is difficult in WiFi. In the WiFi application, if 
CSMA/CA is replaced by TDMA or CDMA, then there is no radio-channel 
contention. However, replacing a radio technology is often difficult due to non-
technical reasons, such as deployment and costs.  
In the IM application, one trivial countermeasure is to disable or block the composing 
notification messages. However, this approach may not work because ordinary 
messages still provide information about the timing of the messages being sent. Eve 
can estimate the period that the contact spends typing to the investigator with a 
constant value, such as 3 seconds. In addition, adding artificial jitters to messages 
may break the semantics of Instant Messaging, where the goal is that instant 




5.2.3. Service-Priority PCD 
Possible defenses against the Service-Priority PCD are not technically difficult to 
implement. One trivial countermeasure is to use a phone’s data service only when 
needed. For example, a user can simply turn off the data service and restore it only 
when certain apps need Internet access. This approach is simple and requires no 
modification of either software or hardware. It is already a common practice for users 
who are conscious of high fees when roaming abroad or exceeding data caps (e.g., 
Using 301 MB or more in AT&T’s 300MB/month plan would cause a double data 
charge). However, the disadvantage is that it destroys most of the convenience of a 
mobile smartphone, since it requires the user to deliberately turn Internet access on 
and off, and makes continuous-access applications like VoIP/Instant Messaging 
impractical.  
A better approach is to use a firewall embedded in the mobile phone, one that can be 
used to detect periodical traffic, and only allowing such traffic to proceed with the 
user’s authorization. The disadvantage of this approach is that it requires modification 
of the mobile phone operating system.  The advantage is that once the firewall is 
provided, it applies to all apps. However, like other anomaly detection systems, there 
may be false detection of “suspicious periodic network traffic”. Therefore, the 





Chapter 6: Conclusion and Future Directions 
In exploiting a novel side channel caused by resource contention, this dissertation 
constructed a powerful new attack, private communication detection (PCD), which  
allows an ordinary network user to obtain remote information without the typically-
assumed capabilities of adversaries, such as malware injection, eavesdropping or 
control of a part or whole of a communication system. The information obtained by 
monitoring the communication pattern (e.g., call time, length, and frequency), does 
not merely provide records of communication, but can also be used to construct the 
tie strength of social networks. Such information has historically been used by 
intelligence, military, law-enforcement and business organizations as a powerful tool 
to monitor persons of interest. Three PCD approaches based on probing the targets 
were proposed and evaluated in four applications. Among PCD countermeasures, 
monitoring and blocking periodic suspicious network traffic is a general solution that 
could work in most cases.  
The Resource-Saturation PCD discovers the busy status of network end-nodes by 
sending special probing messages that can saturate the shared resource in the network 
end-nodes, then analyzing the exceptions in the responses caused by the saturated 
resource. The call records can be inferred by correlating the busy status of the 
network end-nodes. The Resource-Saturation PCD successfully attacked three 
different commercial closed-source VoIP phones, without requiring access to source 
code. 




analysis, the Stochastic PCD takes a classification approach, such that the time series 
of probing responses is categorized, allowing for a probabilistic test of which 
hypothesis of the communication pattern is more likely to be true. Through signal-
processing techniques, this approach can also deal with the noise in the time series 
brought by Internet switching, application proxies, and other nodes in the network. 
This attack has been applied to two applications, WiFi and Instant Messaging, in 
experimental environments. 
The Service-Priority PCD takes advantage of one inherent design principle in many 
communication systems: services are given different priority when the network usage 
may overwhelm the network capacity. This is especially true for mobile 
communication networks. In 3G/2G mobile communication systems where data and 
voice services are both supported, a spike in the probing response time will indicate 
that a voice call is taking place, taking advantage of the network design feature that 
the service level of data service is lowered during a voice call. 
This dissertation successfully bridges communication and mobile privacy research 
with the idea of side-channels, which were originally used in cryptanalysis. The 
proposed attacks suggest that the design of future communication systems should 
consider resource contention as a major potential vulnerability. The vulnerability 
could exist in application or operating system resources (e.g. a fixed-size buffer), 
communication resources (e.g., radio channels), and even in the interaction with 





6.1. Future Directions 
The PCD attack and its implications suggest several directions for promising future 
work. Other aspects of the PCD methods and different kinds of shared resources (and 
the corresponding side channels) that would be worthy for investigation are listed 
below. 
1. Large-scale PCD. We used a simple call model (i.e., uniform-distributed 
beginning time and end time of a call) in Appendix I to calculate the false 
detection rate when PCD is applied to more than two targets. However, 
telephone use really depends on the time, the date, and the user. Therefore, we 
can use the real call records to find a more accurate model and to estimate its 
parameters.  The new model will allow us to better calculate the false 
detection rate in large-scale PCD. Looking at this from the other side, the 
adversary could also apply some heuristics to reduce the false detection rate. 
For example, if three PCD targets show that they are busy during the same 
time, it is unlikely that they are having a conference call because a conference 
call is established either by adding the third party to the existing two-party call 
or by calling to the conference bridge. Instead, it is more likely that two of 
them are talking to each other and the other target is communicating with 
someone else, who is not a target.  
2. The Power of Stochastic PCD. In Stochastic PCD, we found that existing 
signal-processing techniques can reduce the noise in the side channels. On the 




two facts suggest that the theoretical limit of both adding noise and noise 
reduction capacity should be investigated; otherwise, we do not know how 
much added noise would be sufficient to defend against the Stochastic PCD.  
3. 4G mobile communication systems. One of the major differences between the 
4G and 3G mobile communication systems is that 4G uses packet switching to 
deliver both voice and data service while 3G uses packet switching for data 
service and circuit switching for voice service. Therefore, whether Service-
Priority PCD is applicable to 4G is not yet known.  
4. Satellite Communication. Communication satellites are another possible target 
for PCD, because they usually use solar cells and batteries as their power 
sources. Therefore, the energy resource is limited. While multiple components 
of a satellite are using this limited resource, contention takes place. Therefore, 
we suspect that the energy resource contention may cause a side channel. An 
adversary who has access right to use the communication satellites may 
indirectly observe the communication pattern between these satellites or 
between a satellite and a ground station. This attack may have values in 
military or business intelligences. For example, a captured node or weapons 
platform (e.g., a tank) that has military satellite network access may help the 
adversary to monitor the communications in this military satellite network. 
For business intelligence, a satellite network operator may want to get the 
traffic information of its competitor to understand its competitor’s business 
model. In that case, the operator can employ the PCD attack against the 




5. Smartphone Apps. Although mobile phones provide a confined environment 
(e.g., a sandbox, virtual machine) to isolate apps running in the same phone, it 
may be possible for one malicious app to obtain another app’s internal state 
through some shared system resources under contention (e.g., file descriptors, 
and semaphores). Furthermore, the malicious Apps in different smartphones 
can cooperate to correlate the observed information (i.e., behavior of other 
apps) to infer the communication pattern between these smartphones. This 
provides a new set of potential targets for the PCD attack, such as monitoring 
a banking application and the corresponding money flows.  
6. Power Grid. The smart power grid is regarded as another life-changing 
networking technology, similar to the widespread use of the modern Internet. 
We suspect that these smart devices may bring more privacy issues because 
they now have communication abilities. For example, smart meters can 
measure the household electricity usage and report back to the electricity 
provider. It is possible that these smart meters have resource-contention side 
channels and the adversary use them to observe the activities inside a building 





Appendix I.  False Detection Rate for PCD  
We use a simple model to derive the false call-detection rate when the monitored 
phones also communication with third-party phones. We assume that calling time is 
uniformly distributed. If we have telecommunication traffic data, a more accurate 
model can be built. Our model is as follows. 
Model assumption 
1. During T seconds, two phones Alice and Bob are probed for n times with a 
fixed time interval. Phones are probed at time t1,t2,…,tn. 
2. During the T seconds, Alice and Bob both have one call. Alice becomes busy 
during the tX and tY probes (X≤Y and X,Y {1,2,…,n}); Bob becomes busy 
during the tP and tQ probes (P≤Q and P,Q {1,2,…,n}).  
3. X~Uniform(1,n) ,  Y~Uniform(X,n) 
4. P~Uniform(1,n) ,  Q~Uniform(P,n) 
5. X and P are i.i.d.  
6. Y and Q are i.i.d. 
The probability when Alice and Bob’s call have the same start time and end time is 
Pr(F). 
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Suppose there is a call on both phones during a one-hour period, what is the 
probability that these two calls are not the same call? (T=3600 seconds) 
If the time resolution of the busy-status detection is 1 second (n=3600), Pr(F)=0.0024. 
If the time resolution of the busy-status detection is 10 second (n=360), Pr(F)=0.018 
We can easily prove Pr(F) decreases as n increases. It means the higher the probing 
resolution, the lower the false detection rate. 









   
 
 




   
   
    
 














   
 
 
   
 
 











   
 
 
   
 










   
 
 
   





Appendix II. Probe Messages of Resource-Saturation PCD  
Several attack SIP messages are listed here. Note that the adversary should use 
different Call-ID in different requests so they are not being identified as duplicates. 
Message 1. OPTIONS probe message 
OPTIONS sip:wj@iptel.org SIP/2.0 












Message 2. INVITE-require probe message 
INVITE sip:wj@iptel.org SIP/2.0 
















Message 3. INVITE-SDP probe message for Cisco 7940G 
INVITE sip:wj@iptel.org SIP/2.0 




CSeq: 1 INVITE 
Contact: sip:voicepulse@127.0.0.1:5000 
Content-Length: 181 
Content-type:  application/sdp 
Max-Forwards: 70 




o=alice 2890844526 2890844526 IN IP4 192.168.1 
s= 
c=IN IP4 192.168.1a 
t=0 0 








Message 4. INVITE-SDP probe message for Grandstream BT-100 
INVITE sip:wj@iptel.org SIP/2.0 




CSeq: 1 INVITE 
Contact: sip:voicepulse@127.0.0.1:5000 
Content-Length: 181 
Content-type:  application/sdp 
Max-Forwards: 70 




o=- 3530196336 3530196336 IN IP4 128.2.13a 
s=pjmedia 
c=IN IP4 128.2.13.1A 
t=0 0 
a=X-nat:0 
xm=audio 4000 RTP/AVP 103 102 104 117 3 0 8 9 101 


















Message 5. NOTIFY-refer probe message 
NOTIFY sip:wj@iptel.org SIP/2.0 














Appendix III. Disabled Period of Resource-Saturation PCD 
We illustrate the timing of busy-status detection and calculate the disabled period, as 
shown in Figure 47. Consider the three relevant time points of a transaction. The 
black diamond and the white diamond show the time that the SIP phone receives the 
request and responds the request, respectively, whereas the black square denotes the 
end of a transaction. The interval between the first two time points is the processing 
time r, a small time period measured to be between 10ms and 100ms. After this 
interval, a transaction waits for L seconds; e.g., L is 32 seconds (Timer J) for non-
INVITE UDP transactions.  For INVITE UDP transactions, L is 32 seconds (Timer 
H) if no ACK request is received, and is 5 seconds (Timer I) if an ACK request 





Figure 47. Disabled Period 
In calculating the disabled period, we omit the network transmission time since it is 
negligible compared to the disabled period. In Figure 10, time 0 denotes the receipt of 
the 1
st
 request. For the first h requests, the SIP phone takes r seconds to respond to 
each request. The phone will become available to accept a new request after the 1
st
 
request expires, at time r+L. Thus, during time (h-1)*d and time r +L, the phone is 
unable to accept a new request for (r+L)-(h-1)×d seconds.  The response to an 
INVITE request is given after the disabled period.  
Given parameters of PAP2 and 7940G along with an estimated parameter r=20ms, we 
are able to calculate the disabled period of both phones. PAP2 phone’s disabled 
period is 29.54 seconds with parameters L=32sec, d=80ms, and h=32. 7940G phone’s 
disabled period (not shortened) is 31.62 seconds with a different parameter h=6. 
However, by applying disabled-period shortening, the shortened disabled period of 
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